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Article
Judicial Incorporation of Trade Usages:
A Functional Solution to the Opportunism Problem
JULIET P. K.OSTRITSKY

Article 2 of the U C. C. directed courts to look to business norms as a
primary means of interpreting contracts. Recently the new formalists have
attacked this strategy of norm incmporation as a misguided one that will
lead inevitably to significant error costs. Accordingly, they have embraced
plain meaning as the preferred interpretive strategy. This Article argues
that the strategy of rejecting trade usages unless they are part of the
express contract is too rigid. The rejection is premised on an overly
narrow cost/benefit analysis that fails to account for the functional role
that such usages may play in curbing opportunistic behavior and thereby
increasing gains from trade and overall welfare. Plain meaning and
inc01poration must each be evaluated to see how each one can achieve the
parties' presumed instrumental goals of curbing opportunism-the "holdup" game. Decision makers should also consider the particular reasons
why parties failed to include the trade usages n their express contract.
Some of the reasons for omission might argue for and some against norm
inc01poration.
The inc01poration decision should also depend on
assessing the critical structural factors that make self-enforcement of trade
practices possible. /lfter proposing a taxonomy for assessing the
normative issue of inc01poration the Article examines case law. It
suggests that the divergences can be explained by whether invocation
would achieve the parties' fonctional goal of reduced opportunism. The
Article concludes by suggesting that the taxonomy proposed here helps to
overcome some past objections to incorporation strategy.

451

ARTICLE CONTENTS

I.

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 453

II.

LEGAL INTERVENTION THROUGH NORM INCORPORATION:
EXPANDING THE INCORPORATION QUESTION TO INCLUDE
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS .................................................................... 466

III.

CLARIFYING THE SOURCE AND TYPES OF BUSINESS
NORMS .................................................................................................... 468

IV.

WELFARE MAXIMIZATION AND TWO ILLUSTRATIONS FOR
PRIVATE STRATEGIES TO ACHIEVE WELFARE MAXIMIZATION:
SOCIAL COOPERATIVE NORMS AMONG CATTLEMEN
IN SHASTA COUNTY AND THE MERCHANT GUILD ..................... 4 71
A.

THE SUBSTANTfVE NORMS OF COOPERATION: THE KEY
PROBLEM FOR CONTRACTUAL PLAYERS AND OTHERS .................. .472

V.

WHEN DOES EXTRA-LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF NOR.l\1S OR
CONTRACTS WORK EFFECTIVELY? ASSESSING
"STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS" FOR SUCCESS ................................ 480

VI.

A TAXONOMY FOR THE NORM INCORPORATION STRATEGY
QUESTION: WHEN SHOULD THE LAW INTERVENE TO
ENFORCE COMMERCIAL NORMS ..................................................... 483
A.
B.
C.

VII.

TAXONOMY FOR BARGAINING PROBLEMS ...................................... 486
TAXONOMY: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADE USAGES ........................... 487
HOW THE CASE LAW OF TRADE USAGES DEMONSTRATES THE
ROLE OF WELFARE MAXIMIZING NORMS DESIGNED TO
CONTROL PROBLEMS NOT EASILY SOLVED BY CONTRACT ............ 492

HOW THE REFRAMED DEBATE SOFTENS SOME OF THE
CRITICISMS AGAINST THE INCORPORATION STRATEGY .......... 512
A.

THE CRITICISMS .............................................................................. 512

VIII. CONCLUSION: HIERARCHY OF NORMS, ALL NORMS NOT
EQUAL AND THE LEGAL INTERVENTION QUESTION ................. 529

Judicial Incorporation of Trade Usages:
A Functional Solution to the Opportunism Problem
JULIET P. KOSTRITSKY*

I. INTRODUCTION

The role that business norms 1 have played in formulating legal rules
has varied over time. Medieval jurists looked to commercial practices m
' John Homer Kapp Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. B.A.
1976 Harvard College; J.D. 1980 University of Wisconsin.
Thanks are due to Professors Ronald J. Coffey and Peter M. Gerhart. Able research assistance
was provided by Sara Busch, Michael Doty, Hannah Farber, Augustus Makris and Taylor Wesley.
EtTOrs are mine alone. Work on this Article was supported by the Dean's Summer Research Grant
Program.
1
"Business norm" is a general tenn that refers to practices that become a source for law. The
more particular terminology includes custom as well as trade usage, course of dealing, and course of
petformance. Custom, the more traditional term, was thought to be obligatory while trade usage was
not necessarily so. "Unlike practitioners of a trade usage, practitioners of a custom feel some sense of
legal obligation." Jim C. Chen, Code, Custom, and Contract: The Uniform Commercial Code as Law
Merchant, 27 TEX.lNT'L L.J. 91,97 (1992). Custom once played a pivotal role in the English common
law since "English common law derived its rules from a single source: custom." Dale Beck Furnish,
Custom as a Source ofLaw, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 31,31 (Supp. 1982). This Article will avoid the use of
the word custom for two reasons: first, because "[c]ustom as a direct source oflaw in the United States
has been overtaken by our extensive system of reported case precedents and the unrelenting trend
towards legislative norn1s as the pre-em"inent source of rules in this country," id. at 31 (citation
omitted); and second, because the Uniform Commercial Code uses the terminology of "trade usage,"
"course of dealing," and "course of performance" rather than custom, id. at 40.
Since custom is not involved, some argue that there is no need to determine whether the
"practitioners ... feel some sense of legal obligation." Chen, supra, at 97. The emphasis is on
objective evidence of regularly observed practices rather than a subjective sense of obligation that was
required to show a custom. !d.
This Article avoids talking about social norms that arise in social contexts disconnected with any
production function or commerce for several reasons explored below. Examples of such social norms
are rife in life and in the literature. They include norms against wearing animal fur, rudeness, not
bathing, smoking, littering, etc.
In the context of commerce, trade, and production, it can be assumed (using models of average
behavior) that parties will attempt to satisfy the objective of maximizing welfare or gains from trade. A
trade in this context will occur when there is welfare improvement in the sense that the trade will make
one party better off, without making the other party worse off, since "people are inherently hungry for
improvements in their welfare." ROBERT C. ELL!CKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES 170 (1991 ). This is known as "Pareto optimality." People of course start with
different preferences, which affect the "range of prices at which they are willing to deal." E-mail from
Ronald J. Coffey Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, to Juliet P.
Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School (Apr. 30, 2004, 8:54 PM) (on
file with Connecticut Law Review) [hereinafter Coffey, Apr. 30, 2004 E-mail). Each party has a "limit
number," id., and these "limit numbers for each side are a function of the alternatives (to this
exchange)," id. When parties are engaged in commerce in the production function, whether as
medieval merchants or cattlemen, see infra Part N, we can safely assume that when parties develop
practices in such settings, they will be either deliberately designed or spontaneously arise to maximize
the parties' gains from trade. In such situations, when a court is called upon to enforce the contract or
commercial norm because the private means of enforcement are non-existent or weak, enforcement of
the contract or of the commercial norm will promote the parties' achievement of their own welfare
goals, making the court's role an easy one to accept.
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deciding what common law rule should govern a dispute. 2 Eightee th
century rationalists, however, rejected custom as a source of law sine; 1·t
was not the product of deliberate planning. 3 They embraced statutes as
superior source oflaw because of their greater perceived rationality.4
a
In the 20th century, Karl Llewellyn reversed course and re-elevated the
impmiance of commercial practices in the rules of Article 2 of the Uniform
5
Commercial Code (U.C.C.). Rather than imposing legal rules derived
from logic or by a central planner, Llewellyn provided a statutory
framework reflecting the legal realist philosophy that laws should reflect
6
commercial realities. Accordingly, Article 2 of the D.C. C. directs courts
However, in norms in social contexts, without any connection to production or commerce, nom1s
might develop (such as not wearing animal fur or not smoking) without such nonns necessarily being
about efficiency. In such cases, if the law were to intervene to incorporate such a social norm, it would
be favoring one set of values or preferences over another without any "calculus for saying which of the
tastes or preferences involved should take precedence over the other." E-mail from Peter M. Gerhart.
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case
Western Reserve University School (July 5, 2005, 12: !3 PM) (on file with Connecticut Law Review).
ff the law intervenes to favor one preference over another, it may be more difticult to find a valueneutral, efficiency ground for intervention. As a result, it may make more sense to be more
circumscribed about intervening to implement social norms "when we are not ready to say that one
actor's preferences are clearly superior to another's preferences," id., and thus the lmv may therefore
decline to intervene unless it is convinced that favoring one party's preference also has spill~ver effects
that need to be co"ntrolled for efficiency reasons, such as a norm against wearing fur when such "
practice leads to a problem of over-killing ce1tain animals.
2
Justice Mansfield is thought of as the principal architect of a /e:r mercatoria. See Raben D.
Cooter, Stmctural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A A-lode! of Decentralized Lall', 14 lNT'I..
REv. L. & EcoN. 215,216 (1994) (discussing Mansfield's role in r~viewing business practices as the
source for developing rules for bills and notes).
3
Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach Ia
Adjudicating the New Law lvlercha111, 144 U. PA. L. REV. !643, 1650--5! ( 1996).
" The embrace of codes and statutes reflected the "reforming spirit" on the continent thai rejected
the common law because of its association "with the losing side in the revolution that brought
Napoleon and his followers to power." !d. at 1650.
; There are three types of commercial usages recognized under the Code: course of performance.
course of dealing, and usage of trade. These range from the most particular and narrow (i.e .. how
parties have acted in this contract) to the more general (i.e., how contractual parties have acted in prior
dealings with one another) to the most general (i.e., how all parties in the trade treat a particular
matter). U.C.C. § l-303(e) lays out the hierarchy of preference given to these types of commercial
practices. U.C.C. § l-303(e) (2006). Section l-303 displaces former sections l-205 and 2-:'.08. U.C.C.
§ l-303 also expressly directs a court to construe commercial practices and express contractual
language as consistent; where they are inconsistent, the express language governs. U.C.C. ~ 1303(e)(I) (2006). See Chen, supra note I, at 116-17 (analyzing the complicated issues of whether a
trade practice is consistent with express language and arguing that the test of consistency fonnulated by
courts results in too much exclusion of evidence from the fact finder); see also Eyal Zamir. The
Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Jnte1pretation and Supplementation, 97 CoLUr,: L. REV. 1710, 171 4
(1997) (questioning this hierarchy of preference and suggesting "an inverted hier:rchy". in which the
written contract, rather than being afforded primacy, should be, and is in fact, . •Ibservient to the
standards of reasonableness and good faith).
6
See generalfcv Roger W. Kirst, Usage of Trade and Course of Dealing: Subpersio. · ufthe U.C.C.
Theon•, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 8!!, 812 (1977) (discussing Llewellyn's insistence that courts deemphasize
the la~guage of written agreements and logic and instead should read them in light of their commercial
66
contexts). See also Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial [{llr.
U. CHI. L. REV. 781, 78 !-82 & n.4 (!999) (discussing the impact oflegal realism on the jurisprudenc~
of Llewellyn and the Code). Looking at the actual practice of pmties to find the mle is a "bottom~upl
11 1
decentralized method of lawmaking, rather than a "top-down" centralized method of lawmaking. w c
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to search for "immanent business norms" to interpret parties' contracts8
and, more broadly, to decide disputes. 9 Business norms recognized by the
U.C.C. include: trade usages (applying across a wide range of
counterparties); course of dealing (focusing on how parties to a current
transaction have behaved in prior dealing); and course of perfonnance
(covering conduct between parties to a current contract that takes place
over a period of time). 10 Such business norms are essentially patterns of
behavior amounting to substantive agreements that certain contingencies
will be dealt with in a specified manner. Under the norm incorporation
strategy of the U.C.C. these patterns are part of the actual agreement 11
unless the parties carefully negate them. 12
The new formalists have attacked the norm incorporation strategy of
Article 2 as misguided. 13 They have championed plain meaning and literal
relies on centrally imposed legal rules. See Cooter, supra note 3, at 1643-44 (noting that
"( d]ecentralized law begins with customs and contracts" and differs from regulatory law imposed by a
~entral planner).
7
Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765, 1766 & n.l (1996). See also Richard Danzig, A
Comment on the Jurispmdence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621, 635 (1975)
(suggesting "that the animating theory of Article II is that law is immanent."),
8
Such commercial norms are also used to fill gaps in and interpret contracts. See Jody S. Kraus
& Steven D. Walt, In Defense of the Inc01poration Strategy, in JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 193, 193, 219-20 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000)
(explaining the U.C.C.'s rules regarding the use of extrinsic evidence to fill contractual gaps).
9
Bernstein, supra note 7, at 1766.
10
See supra note 5.
11
U.C.C. § l-20l(b)(3) (2006); see also Amy H. Kastely, Stock Equipment for the Bargain in
Fact: Trade Usage, "E-.:press Terms," and Consistency under Section 1-205 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 777, 779 & n.lO (1986).
12
See U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt. 2 (2003) ("Unless carefully negated they have become an element of
the meaning of the words used.") There are complicated questions about whether the norms should be
admitted if they contradict the express terms of the contract and how one decides if the usage does
contradict the contract.
13
The fonnalists embrace the Restatement and common Jaw which evidence a more literal
minded, "plain meaning" approach to interpretation. See Clayton P. Gillette, The Lm11 Merchant in the
Modem Age: Institutional Design and lntemational Usages under the CISG, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 157
(2004). There are several categories of criticism of the more flexible incorporation strategy of the
U.C.C. Lisa Bernstein uses empirical data to argue that such widespread customary practices in fact do
not exist, at least in certain industries in a certain time period. See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable
Empirical Basis of Article 2's Inc01poration Strategy: A PreliminGIJ' Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710
(1999).
Other criticism focuses on the process by which the norms themselves arise and finds that
nonoptimal, inefficient norms may arise that do not warrant recognition. See Eric A. Posner, Law,
Economics and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1724 (1996). These critics argue that the
incorporation of norms should not be automatic since some conditions favor the development of
inefficient norms. See Cooter, supra note 3, at 1655-56 (arguing that the "incentive structure" present
when a custom arises influences the efficiency or inefficiency of the resultant norm, and that efficient
nonns should be enforced); see also Gillette, supra, at 160-61 (delineating conditions for developing
nonns that warrant recognition).
The third criticism argues that the costs of incorporation will outweigh the benefits under the
conditions that exist for most contracting parties. See Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in
Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 847 (2000). Professor Scott argues that under a realistic view
?f conditions that are likely to prevail, namely "competent parties and incompetent courts," formalism
Is a better interpretive methodology for maximizing value for the parties. Id. at 875. This Article
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interpretation
as the preferred methodology
and rejected an
interventionist role for courts in favor of a more circumscribed one. 16
Scholars evaluating nonn incorporation argue that the choice between
these competing interpretive strategies (plain meaning versus
incorporation) 17 should depend on an analysis of which strategy
"maximizes the value of the contract [while] minimizing the sum of all
contracting" 18 and other costs that reduce gains from trade. Though in
agreement on a cost/benefit framework, different scholars emphasize
varying costs that arise with each strategy. 19 Incorporationists argue that a
plain meaning strategy will increase specification costs since parties cannot
rely on courts to incorporate common usages into their contracts.20 Plain
meaning advocates argue that interpretive and error costs21 would
necessarily be greater with an incorporationist strategy. 22 In fact, antiincorporationists postulate that the error costs of incorporation are so
"excessive that almost any plain meaning regime would be preferable."23
This Aliicle posits that the anti-incorporation strategy view that
business practices should be denied all legal enforcement unless they are
develops a cost benefit analysis for detem1ining whether intervention will enhance welfare. Current
cost benefit analysis assumes, unlike Professor Bernstein's paper, that norms do exist, but that it is
always too costly to prove the relevant norms. This Article disagrees, arguing that there is no
categorical answer to the cost issue. Both this Article and current cost benefit analysis would accept
Bernstein's argument that if norms could not be proven and did not exist, they should not be
incorporated. This Article accepts Cooter's argument that not all norms are efficient since the
efficiency of a norn1 depends on structural factors. Hpwever, this Article demonstrates that many
norn1s promote efficiency by solving problems, which, if left unsolved, would create a drag on gains
from trade. This Article implicitly admits, however, that where norms are dysfunctional and
inefficient, they should not be incorporated.
14
It is not clear that "plain meaning" has an identifiable meaning.
15
See, e.g., Scott, supra note I3, at 848.
16
The question of how broadly a court should intervene is most likely to arise in incomplete
contracts. There the new formalists argue that where the parties have left the contract incomplete by
failing to condition on certain variables (which will be~ome known once the future happens), those
parties will not adopt such variables and will be reluctant to have the court supply such variables since
they are not verifiable. See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theo1y
of Contract Design, 56 CASE WES. L. REv. I 87, I 95 (2005); see also Karen Eggleston et al., The
Design and lnte1pretation a/Contracts: Why Complexity Mailers, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 9I, 100 (2000)
(explaining verifiability limitation and its role in incompleteness).
17
This Article assumes that all contracts are incomplete and therefore courts must be involved in
gap filling to "resolve alleged uncertainties." See Gillette, supra note I3, at I57.
18
Id. at I 57. Such a strategy would serve the parties' own interests.
19
Jd. at I58.
20
Other costs would arise since "the use of terms with idiosyncratic meanings, understood within
a trade but not by outsiders, would give rise to judicial interpretations not intended by the parties." !d.
Incorporation permits the ready incorporation of these meanings without requiring express inclusion.
11
Error costs are the market inefficiencies and economic losses that occur when judicial decisions
improperly interpret business norms. See Kraus & Walt, supra note 8, at !99-200 (discussing error
costs).
11
!d. Error costs arise because the "contextual significance of trade usages requires adjudicators
to discover the alleged usage, define its scope, and determine its application to the issue at hand-all in
all, a costly and error-prone process." Gillette, supra note I3, at !58.
13
Id. at I 93; see also Scott, supra note I3, at 848 (noting a contrasting advantage of fonnalized
approach in promoting certainty and "expanding the menu of legally blessed standard-form terms").
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part of the express contract is too rigid. Current cost/benefit comparisons
of plain meaning and incorporation strategies are incomplete because they
fail to assess the functional role24 that privately developed trade usages
play in achieving parties' goals, such as the control of opportunistic
behavior and other hazards that might be difficult to control ex ante by
express contract. What is missing is a functional goal-oriented view.
The supposed error costs of incorporating trade usages cannot be
ascertained without first determining what function the trade usage is
serving. The likelihood or magnitude of judicial error costs might decrease
once the purpose of the trade usage is identified, at least in cases where
opportunistic behavior by the defendant is clear, the trade usage is
designed to deter that type of opportunism, and enforcement of the trade
usage will not promote parallel opportunistic behavior by the plaintiff.
The plain meaning strategy, employing a default approach that would
deny legal effect to trade usage/ 5 and the incorporation strategy must each
be evaluated to see how, if at all, they can help parties achieve specific
goals. Current analyses are incorrect in suggesting that categorical
answers to the question of the normative desirability of a norm
incorporation strategy can be reached26 solely by comparing the projected
theoreticae7 increased costs of specification (from plain meaningi 8 against
error costs (from contextualized norm incorporation) in the abstract. 29

24

There is no necessary assumption that these trade usages have been deliberately designed to
achieve certain goals; they may have evolved spontaneously over time and survived because of their
capacity to remain "serviceable to the individuals which move within such order," and to protect the
group. I F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 39 (1973).
25
Parties could opt out of the default rule of plain meaning by specifically indicating that they
preferred that the court resort to and invoke trade meanings and commercial practices.
.
26
See also Gillette, supra note 13, at 159 (rejecting an "all-or-nothing" approach in evaluating an
interpretive strategy).
27
Id. at 159.
28
Presumably, plain meaning strategy would increase drafting burdens on parties who could no
longer rely on courts to supply terms for them. See, e.g., Kraus & Walt, supra note 8, at I 99,
29
Another cost of a contextualized approach to interpretation is "encrustation." Encrustation
occurs when courts give undue weight to implied terms making it difficult for parties to persuade a
court to recognize that the parties have opted out of the standard implied term with an express term.
This reluctance creates "barriers to innovative forms of contractual agreement." See Charles J. Goetz
& Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interaction Between Express
and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261,264 (1985); see also Kraus & Walt, supra note 8, at
217.
Comparing the costs looks at these competing methodologies to see which "has a theoretical
advantage." Gillette, supra note 13, at 157-58. Others have used empirical data to demonstrate that
parties themselves opt out of the more informal rules of the U.C.C. preferring to subscribe to a more
rorrnalistic "private legal system." Professor Bernstein uses such data to suggest that the U.C.C.'s
mforrnal contextualized approach should be rejected since it interferes with the U.C.C.'s avowed aim of
promoting flexibility and with the parties' ability to renegotiate contracts. Bernstein, supra note 7, at
1769-71; see also Richard A. Epstein, Confusion About Custom: Disentangling Informal Customs from
Standard Contractual Provisions, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 82 I, 822 (I 999) (noting the beneficial role of
trade associations in crafting optimal rules that "deviate . . . from the discordant set of customary
prac!Jces").
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A plain meaning specific approach, with its narrow focus on what the
parties included in the contract, will often fail to help the parties achieve
their instrumental goal of controlling opportunism. This is because many
contracts remain incomplete due to bargaining impediments. Literalistic
enforcement of the contract, therefore, will not achieve the parties'
functional goals unless one also assumes the parties can effectively selfenforce the trade usages designed to control opportunistic behavior and
supplement the incomplete express contract. Of course, the additional
benefit to the parties from controlling opportunism would have to be
weighed against error costs that still occurred when courts incorporated
norms in such a way that it increased opportunism or led to incorrect
conclusions about who was in fact acting opportunistically. A plain
meaning approach may be costly in terms ofunremedied opportunism.
To decide the incorporation issue, a multi-factored approach should be
used. The functions trade usages are intended to serve, including control
of opportunistic behavior and the increased incentive a party has to engage
in opportunistic behavior when there is a potential windfall to a party
seeking to deviate from the trade usage should be considered. 30 The
decision-maker should ask whether the substantive practice would advance
the welfare of the parties. The decision-maker should also consider
reasons why parties might fail to include the practice in their express
contract and whether the failure is understandable in terms of structural
barriers to bargaining or other reasons. 31 Some of these reasons for
omission might argue for and some against norm incorporation and should
be examined in detail. 32
The correct analytical starting point for evaluating the incorporation
strategy for trade usages begins with a recognition that incorporation of
norms is a form of collective legal intervention to solve the incomplete
contract problem. 33 As such, it must be justified in instrumental terms as a
means to increase gains from trade, projecting the ex ante and ex post.
Resolving the welfare issue requires courts to recognize the behavioral
assumption that parties in transactional settings will attempt to maximize
the gains from trade. Tr~de usages, especially those that are designed to
control a counterparty's propensity to act opportunistically during
performance, act as private strategies to maximize gains from trade when
30
Presumably the error costs of incorporating trade usages associated with discerning the correct
usage and the correct domain of the usage are less problematic if the function of the usage is designed
to control a universal and recurring problem of opportunism.
31
See generally Juliet P. Kostritsky, Taxonomy for JustifYing Legal Intervention in an Impeifect
World: What to Do When the Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted Incomplete
Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REv. 323 (2004) (discussing role of bargaining impediments in assessing
private and public strategies in incomplete contracts).
32
For a discussion of these other reasons see infra text at pp. 503--04.
33
Because the U.C.C. incorporates the trade usages by supplementing the agreement or by using
them to interpret the contract, structures justifying legal intervention in incomplete contracts may be
helpful.
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pmiies face barriers to including general terms to control opportunism in
their express contractual arrangement. 34 Without some means of
controlling the omnipresent "incentives to cheat,"35 the parties (and
society) would be worse off since parties would be reluctant to invest or
contract with other parties. 36 When the self-interest of the individual
diverges from greater overall welfare, some "foundation of mechanisms" is
needed to control that divergence. 37 The problem is one of "deter[ring]
socially costly but privately beneficial behavior, or, put differently, to
solve collective action problems that arise among citizens."38
Besides the structural barriers to bargaining that interfere with express
incorporation parties may fail to include trade usages in their express
contracts for other reasons. Each of these reasons for non-inclusion might
have different implications for the question of whether judicial
enforcemel)t would be justified as welfare-maximizing. Parties might omit
the practice because they might want the flexibility to decide later whether
to honor a practice in a particular case. 39 This Article will identify the

34
E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School (July 16,
1996, 1:37 PM) (on file with Connecticut Law Review). The existence of such impediments to
bargaining suggests that the parties may not be able to achieve their first best objective of maximizing
gains from trade. The further question that then arises when such impediments exist is whether the
parties could devise strategies on their own to overcome such impediments for welfare improvement or
whether some further legal intervention might be required.
Parties may resort to private strategies not only because the problem may be difficult to solve by a
contract but also because the weakness of the state and the legal system make contractual solutions
impracticable. The existence of such impediments to bargaining suggests that the parties may not be
able to achieve their first best objectives of maximizing gains from trade. The further question that
then arises when such impediments exist is whether the parties could devise strategies on their own to
overcome such impediments for welfare improvement or whether some further legal intervention might
be required. See, e.g., Avner Greif et al., Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of
the Merchant Guild, I 02 J. POL ECON. 745, 746-48 (1994) (examining privately developed and
enforced trade embargo mechanism in the face of a weak state and undeveloped legal remedies).
Recognizing that commercial norms exist as one private solution to the incomplete contracting
problem means that an evaluation of whether legal enforcement of private norms would enhance
welfare must consider some of the relative advantages and disadvantages of other arrangements for
solving opportunism problems, as well as the costs of and likely success of private informal
enforcement of the trade usages.
35
ERIC A POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 149 (2000) (detailing merchants' private efforts to
control such cheating).
36
While "everyone can potentially benefit from the creation or addition of economic value ...
each participant in the process usually has available to him various actions that increase his own gain,
while lowering the others' gain by a greater amount." AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND
ECONOMICS ALTERNATIVE MODES OF GOVERNANCE 1 (2004) (attributing success of market economies
to successful efforts to deter opportunism). Douglas North explains the problem for society of such
divergence as follows: "without institutional constraints, self-interested behavior will foreclose
complex exchange, because of the uncertainty that the other party will find it is his or her interest to
live up to the agreement." DOUGLAS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 33 (1990).
37
DIXIT, supra note 36, at 2.
38
POSNER, supra note 35, at 4.
39
The parties might want to dishonor the practice if circumstances materialize that might affect
whether the practice should be honored and a party, rather than a court, might be in a better position to
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circumstances in which parties might be better equipped to make those
judgments. Such circumstances include cases where the possibility of
opportunistic behavior exists for both parties, making the ready
determination of opportunistic behavior difficult to judge. 40 Judicial nonenforcement of commercial practice might also be warranted where the
prime reason for omitting to incorporate is that the custom functions as a
41
signaling device of superior attributes. In that case judicial enforcement
of the custom might detract from its signaling capability, as parties would
no longer adhere to the practice to signal their worth but because of
judicial enforcement.
When understandable barriers prevent express inclusion of a trade
usage designed to increase wealth by policing opportunism in the express
contract, or when the trade usage serves an important signaling function, or
parties wish to retain flexibility, the framework provided here will provide
a partial answer as to whether incorporation of the substantive trade usage
will increase welfare.
The cost/benefit welfare calculus of the alternate approaches must also
examine the means by which the particular substantive norms could be
enforced and at what cost. Business norms could be enforced by relying
solely on private compulsions, informal enforcement, a coordinated
merchant network, or by court sanction (or perhaps by some combination
of these systems). 42 Structural conditions that would contribute to
successful non-legal enforcement of the practice, including the presence of
a closely-knit group, the observability of deviance from the nonn, ready
transmission of information about breaches and defections, oppmiunities
for repeat dealing, 43 and varied opportunities for interaction that allow
parties to punish defection in a number of different ways, should be
considered in a comparative assessment of these systems for norm
enforcement. 44 Thus, this Article is in the tradition of scholarship that
seeks not to "deal comprehensively with all the variables that may be
relevant in predicting the efficacy or prevalence of private ordering" 45 but
judge whether the circumstances merit a departure from custom. Then the reason for omission might
counsel prudence in enforcing the custom.
40
Parties might wish to retain that flexibility when they think that they will be able to judge the
meaning of a practice in the context of later arising circumstances better than a court.
41
See POSNER, supra note 35, at 5 (explaining conformity to dress norms as a signal).
41
See Sergio G. Lazzarini et al., Order with Some Law: Complementarity versus Substitution of
Formal and Informal Arrangements, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 261 (2004).
43
This factor of repeat dealing with its "prospects for future transactions inducing compliance
with current contractual obligations-is a mainstay in the literature on private ordering." Barak D.
Richman, Essay, Firms, Courts, and Reputational Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theo!Ji of Private
Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 2328,2339 (2004).
44
ELLICKSON, supra note I, at 179. Professor Ellickson fmds that when there are many
opportunities to interact, there is a "multiplex relationship" with an opportunity to "deal with each other
along many different fronts. The prospect of a continuing multiplex relationship guarantees a rich
menu of future opportunities to render self-help sanctions." I d. at 179 n.44.
45
Richman, supra note 43, at 2332.
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rather to classify the types of business norms, the reasons for omission and
the stmctural factors that would determine the comparative efficacy of
private and judicial ordering. Whether informal societal pressure can be
effective in securing self-enforcement of the commercial norms depends
on a variety of stmctural factors. 46 If the stmctural factors that make selfenforcement possible are not present and self-interest dictates a divergence
from commercial norms, or specialization demands that performance be
delegated to agents, thereby subjecting the principal to the risks of
cheating,47 then other forms of organized community pressure may be
required as a supplement to self-enforcement.
Several factors are relevant in assessing which of these systems would
have a comparative advantage in providing the "transactional assurance"
needed for economic prosperity and growth. 48 These include: (1) whether
a legal system or coordinated merchant system exists at all; (2) whether the
substantive legal mles require technical expertise or a particularized need
for speed in resolution; (3) whether instead the matter concerns behavior
that would be transparent to an outsider or whether the parties would have
infonnation not available to outsiders; 49 and (4) whether there might be
scale economies from legal intervention. 50 Presumably, if the substantive
norm can be justified as value maximizing, and legal enforcement is likely
to be more effective or less costly than private enforcement based on the
factors referred to above, then judicial enforcement could be justified as
the best means to increase value for the parties.
That framework should be applied to see whether informal reputational
enforcement of commercial norms, private compulsion, or a coordinated
merchant network exist or would be effective or whether government
intervention would be required or desirable. Thus, even if the substantive
content of a trade usage can be justified on the grounds that it allows
pmiies to overcome impediments to the express inclusion of a term in a
contract to increase gains from trade, a final question remains as to the
choice of an enforcer for the particular substantive nonns in particular
settings.
The choice of an enforcer must include the possibility that courts are
imperfect, but also recognize that courts might have a comparative

46

These include the observability of deviance from the nonn and the effectiveness of social
sanctions which depends on the existence of such factors as a close-knit community and the ready
transmission of knowledge about the deviance.
47
See NORTH, supra note 36, at 55 (linking rise of delegation to agents to problems of increased
opportunism); see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The01y of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Casts and Ovmership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (analyzing theories of
agency and ownership structure).
48
Richman, supra note 43, at 2329.
49
See id. at 2341-42; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
50
See Avery W. Katz, Contractual Incompleteness: A Transactianal Perspective, 56 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 169, 176 (2005) (noting that economies of scale may justify litigation costs).
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advantage in policing against opportunism in certain circumstances, 51
especially when there is clear evidence of opportunistic behavior by one
party, large sunk costs, and no possibility for parallel opportunistic
behavior by the other party. 52
Government intervention may be required not only when there is a
misalignment between the personal preference and the social welfare but in
addition when parties fail to account for the harms on others outside the
group. When social norms benefit group members, but harm those outside
the group, an externality problem is created. 53
There are ordinarily no external effects with contractual agreements,
but there are likely to be divergences and defections; therefore, the
resolution of government intervention should depend on the prior
framework.
The stakes of the incorporation decision are high. Unless the court
enforces the private usage or private enforcement devices are effective, the
problem of opportunistic behavior may go uncontrolled and parties may
defect. If private enforcement is ineffective or more costly, then the failure
of courts to enforce will lead to deadweight losses54 as parties react to the
uncontrolled hazard of opportunism. 55 Reactions could include decreased
investment and an unwillingness to contract at all. 56
If trade usages are specifically devised to control a potential hazard
and maximize benefits, then a strategy of incorporating those usages may
51
POSNER, supra note 35, at 154 (recognizing that the threat of legal enforcement can deter
opportunism even though the court is unable to distinguish when a breach has occurred); see also
ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 249-53 (suggesting differences in relative competence of enforcers in
reducing deadweight losses and suggesting comparative advantage to government where there are
"[g]roups with large or transitory memberships" or "social imperfections").
52
This may be because only one party has sunk costs and is therefore vulnerable to holdup.
53
[am using externality here to "refer to the fact that a loss was not bargained into on agreement
prior to the occurrence of the loss" which raises an efficiency issue. E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey,
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of
Law, Case Western Reserve University School (June 28,2005, 3:49PM) (on file with Connecticut Law
Review).
54
The phrase "deadweight losses" refers to the "objective aggregate shortfall members would
suffer were they to fail to exploit all potential gains from trade." ELLICKSON, supra note I, at 172.
55
Parties can use a variety of private mechanisms to overcome such problems given the inherent
difficulties with contractual solutions when sunk costs, opportunism and behavioral uncertainty are
present. One such solution is vertical integration or property ownership. See OUVER HART, FIRMS
CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 23-33 (1995) (exploring why barriers to ex ante contracting
and problems of ex post negotiation costs, including the possibility of the hold up of the party who has
invested transaction specific costs, may be partly solved by property ownership of a firm). Francesc'l
Parisi explains that conventions may also help mitigate the defection problem that results in nonoptimal outcomes that would otherwise materialize when "defection promises higher payoffs and there
is no contract enforcement mechanism." Francesco Parisi, Customary Law, in l THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 572, 575 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). Parties' control
mechanisms to manage opportunism will increase joint surplus beyond what would exist if such
opportunism were uncontrolled. See 0LNER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 6~
( 1996) (asserting that "the mitigation of hazards can be the source of mutual gain"); see also Lazzanm
et al., supra note 42, at 289-90 (arguing that enforcement of formal contracts can be beneficial when
contracts are incomplete on non-contractible dimensions).
56
DIXIT, supra note 36, at 2.
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provide significant advantages over a plain meaning strategy that
automatically excludes them from legal enforcement. When a court
intervenes by enforcing private usages to curb opportunistic behavior, the
court's enforcement of private usage will curb a deadweight loss. 57
Parties often cannot curb opportunistic behavior by detailed controls ex
ante in part because they cannot anticipate all the myriad forms of
opportunism.
Generalized clauses that might be negotiated as an
alternative means of controlling opportunism under conditions of bounded
rationality and that might obligate the parties to act in their joint best
interests may not be sufficient to assure parties that they will not be taken
advantage of because they will either be disbelieved or too vague to be
enforceable and thus will not be effective.58 Parties may accord little
weight to such generalized clauses because the clause means nothing if
subscribed to by parties with a proclivity for opportunism-a matter that
will remain unknown until it is too late. Commercial usages, on the other
hand, have the advantage of being developed by a wide group of parties
and subscribed and adhered to as the best practice for dealing with certain
unaddressed contingencies, many of which would control opportunism, if
enforced, but facilitate opportunism if denied enforcement.
The
development of trade usages gives the court a clear benchmark against
which to measure opportunistic behavior when one party seeks to deviate.
Recent attacks on the norm incorporation strategy 9 stem from the
failure to situate it squarely within the context of structural impediments
(that include uncertainty about the probabilities of opportunism) and the
failure to develop a particularized comparative functional cost/benefit
analysis that takes account of the kind of opportunism that many trade
usages are designed to overcome. Those failures have led to a number of
analytical errors in the criticisms launched against the norm incorporation
strategy.
Ignoring bargaining impediments has caused critics of
incorporation to reject a default rule that incorporates commercial practices
and to assume mistakenly that gains from trade will be maximized when
commercial practices remain legally unenforceable. They argue that
parties intentionally operate in two parallel universes or domains, the
57

The intervention question here is different than the one presented when courts are asked to
supply tenns that parties have studiously avoided incorporating in their contract because their
noncontractible nature will increase the chance for opportunistic claims. If parties have avoided
making the buyer's price contingent on the future realization of the unverifiable state of demand, courts
should decline to later condition obligations on such demand. Doing so would give one party the
unbargained-for opportunity to falsely claim low demand to get a better price, thereby promoting a
moral hazard problem.
Professor Alan Schwartz addresses the moral hazard problem in discussing the verifiability
problem in contracting. See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of
Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271,272 (1992).
58
See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS,
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 47-49 (1985).
59

See supra pp. 455-56.
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formal and informal, and do not intend for commercial practices outside
the express contract.to be enforced. 60 Understanding the functional role of
trade usages in curbing opportunism and increasing joint gains mitigates
the critics' unqualified arguments for plain meaning and informal
enforcement.
Part II of the Article argues that the norm incorporation strategy is a
form of legal intervention that should be justified in instrumental terms and
that many current analyses of norms, in both social and commercial
contexts, incompletely analyze that issue.
Part III outlines a structure for clarifying the meaning and the source of
business norms. It examines different sources for norms including private
compulsions that develop without interaction with others. It also examines
norms that arise through interaction between parties to an exchange.
Part IV argues that the key to understanding the role that the corui
should assume with norms is to understand the parties' goals. In the
context of communities and contracts, parties will work to control
defection and opportunism to increase gains from trade. Pmiies may work
to internalize externalities so that the pursuit of private gain does not
adversely impact the community and efficiencies can be achieved. 61 Part
IV looks at private strategies that parties can use to minimize deadweight
losses and maximize gains in the hypothetical context of the stylized
prisoner's dilemma. Part IV concludes by looking at two empirical
settings illustrating successful private efforts to promote cooperative
behavior and control deviant behavior: Shasta County cattlemen62 and
medieval merchant guilds.
Part V identifies the critical structural factors that facilitate informal
norm enforcement. Part V argues that if such robust self-enforcement
mechanisms do not exist, it may be beneficial if the law enforces such
norms.
Part VI suggests a taxonomy for assessing the business nonn
incorporation strategy. The taxonomy starts with the parties' presumed
goals of curbing opportunism to maximize gains from trade. It then
explains the various reasons why parties might not "situate a custom's

°

6
Critics argue that incorporation will have other negative effects, including the increase of moral
hazard and interpretive error, and the misguided incorporation of relationship preserving norms into an
end game situation. See Bernstein, supra note 7, at 1796-1802.
61
When a contractual agreement benefits the parties, but visits significant harms or losses on
those not a party to the agreement, an externality occurs. Examples include the Mafia code of silence,
and race discrimination. Both of these practices benefit parties who engage in them, but significantly
harm parties outside the agreement. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation ofNorms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338,349,389 (1997).
62
See Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase ond Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986).
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substantive content in their main contractual con1111unication."63 These
reasons include structural impediments that interfere with ex ante
contractual controls of opportunism hazards. It is important that such
hazards be mitigated either infmmally through the pmiies or through legal
enforcement. Legal enforcement should depend on a number of factors.
Rather than rejecting the strategy of incorporation as invariably flawed, 64
courts should look at how strong the factors are that would support
informal enforcement. Courts should also consider the benefit that legal
enforcement has when it can be invoked by parties as a way of establishing
one's reputation and detening large scale defections. 65 Finally, because
there are logical explanations for omitting a commercial trade practice,
courts should be willing to incorporate such business nonns if doing so
would achieve greater net benefits for the patiies than the strategy of
denying enforcement. Pmi VI outlines a number of factors that determine
whether the "nature of the substantive issue"66 wanants legal enforcement.
Pmi VI also examines case law in which courts routinely incorporate
trade usages to curb oppmiunistic behavior. It offers contrasting cases in
which courts deny that a trade usage exists or refuse to apply it, most often
when the pmiy seeking relief is acting opportunistically by trying to shield
himself from contractually assumed risk or when recognition of the trade
usage would pennit the claimant to act opportunistically by shifting his
own losses to the other party. The vmying results in the case law can be
explained by whether invocation of and recognition of the trade usage
would achieve the functional purpose of reduced opportunism, the
structural impediments to express incorporation of trade usage and the
relative cost of legal enforcement when compared to informal enforcement
mechanisms. Legal enforcement costs might rise when a comi might have
a difficult time judging which party is guilty of opportunistic behavior.
The difficulty of verification could, for reasons to be explained later, be
pmiicularly vexing and is likely to mise in contexts in which one party
claims that another's course of dealing or course of performance has
permanently altered contractual rights, making it impossible to insist on
enforcement of those rights. 67 The case law illustrates the operation of the
taxonomy for deciding the incorporation question. Part VII utilizes the
fl-amework suggested here to reexamine criticisms of nonn incorporation
strategy. Pmi VIII concludes the Aliicle.
63

E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School (June 28,
2003,4:23 PM) (on file with Connecticut Law Review) [hereinafter Coffey, June 28, 2003 E-mail].
64
See Bernstein, supra note 7, at 1768-69.
6
; Cf POSNER, supra note 35, at 158.
66
Katz, supra note 50.
67
Omri Ben-Shahar argues that where uncertainty makes it difficult for a promisee to detect
breaches, the cutTent flexible approach of the U.C.C. will make a promisee worse off by necessitating
"more expenditure on monitoring." Ben-Shahar, supra note 6, at 812.
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LEGAL INTERVENTION THROUGH NORM INCORPORATION: EXPANDING
THE INCORPORATION QUESTION TO INCLUDE FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

Whether the law should incorporate a business norm68 into a contract
should depend on whether legal incorporation of that norm can be justified
in efficiency terms. 69
If the parties enter into a complete contract and specifically add all of
the relevant trade usages controlling behavior and terms of art 70 that they
want to govern their contract and its interpretation, the efficiency question
would be easy. There would be no need to confront the normative question
of whether trade usages that are not part of the express contract should be
recognized.
Because of structural impediments, however, it may be difficult for the
patties to reach a completely contingent contract that solves all of their
problems. One of the ways that courts may respond to the incompleteness
in a contract is by incorporating parties' trade usages and business norms
into the contract.
Of course, when courts enforce business norms, through the U.C.C.,
that were not included in the express terms of the contract, they are
intervening. 71 The law could decide to limit enforcement to the express
terms of the contract. 72 Alternatively, courts could intervene by adding
terms to supplement the parties' agreement. 73 However, the particular type
GG The commercial norm could take the form of a course of dealing, course of performance or
usage of trade. See U.C.C. § 1-303 (2006). Most of the case law examples will involve usages of
trade. See infra Part VI.
69
Some scholars argue that norms are likely to be efficient and norm incorporation will
automatically result in efficient results. Others argue that under certain circumstances norms are likely
to be inefficient and the efficiency of the incorporation decision must therefore depend on the
circumstances in which the norm was developed. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 3, at 1691 (pointing to
negative spillover effects or externalities as indicating structural deficiency that may yield inefficient
customary nom1s).
I will assume that efficiency is an appropriate norm for contract rules to pursue. Moreover,
failure to give legal effect to utilitarian commercial norms may cause parties to devise other means to
achieve their goals that could be more costly. See supra note 55.
For an intent based argument that custom and course of perfommnce should be incorporated
because they form part of the parties' language and thus reflect the parties' assent to such
incorporation, see infra text accompanying notes 77-83.
70
Kraus & Walt, supra note 8, at 199. The Kraus and Walt article discusses efficiencies in parties
being able to use terms of art that courts will recognize as "analogous to the efficiency of terms of art
within academic and technical disciplines." !d. By enforcing the contract and incorporating trade
specific meanings between the parties, the court would implement optimal outcomes and avoiding the
translation costs incurred when parties convert "understandings already carried by domain-specific
meanings of available specialized terms into an equivalent using the plain-meaning' of terms .... " !d.
71
This Article will use intervention as the financial and institutional economists do to refer to
instances in which courts add terms beyond the ordinary meaning attached to express words. However,
as Professor Craswell points out, even questions of interpretation of express terms may require a court
to choose to assign them an ordinary meaning or some other approach. See Richard Craswell, The
"Incomplete Contracts" Literature and Efficient Precautions, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 151, 154
(2005).
n See, e.g., Ben-Shahar, supra note 6, at 786.
73
These include default terms of price, delivery date, etc. See U.C.C. § 2-305 (2003).
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of intervention involved in the norm incorporation strategy is of a peculiar
type of governmental intervention. Instead of formulating a common law
rule on its own or drafting a law or term to govern, the legal decision
maker gives legal effect to substantive practices already formulated and
adhered to by private parties. 74
With this peculiar "hybrid" type of legal intervention in which the
court enforces, supplements and interprets private agreements using
business nonns/ 5 the court's role may remain hidden. The intervention
implicit in the legal incorporation ofpmiies' norms does not seem obvious,
especially when one considers that scholars and judges consistently repeat
the adage that norm incorporation involves finding the parties' own
business norms rather than making law. 76 But the decision to give legal
effect to those norms still requires an instrumental justification.
Professor David Snyder confronts the intervention question by arguing
that because business norms are in effect part of the parties' language as
much as express words are, they should be given similar effect. 77
Professor Snyder justifies intervention based on protecting the intention of
the parties to the deal, an intention that can be reflected both in the express
bargain and in the trade usages or business norms followed by the pmiies. 78
The argument is that business custom is part of the parties' language
and should be given the same effect as the parties' express words. 79
"[C]ustom and usage (across sets of counter parties) and prior course of
dealing ._ .. are really express terms," not part of the substantive contract
but yet not completely "unspoken."80 Instead, nonverbal conduct exists in
the fonn of a pattern of conduct. "A custom might be a pattern that
exhibits the following express content: 'If such-and-such a contingency
occurs, parties will respond thus-and-so. "' 81
The language-based rationalization for the incorporation of custom and
conduct is in essence a "linguistic" argument. "Language, as Wittgenstein
taught and as the drafters of the original Code knew, consists of more than
words. "82 Under this approach the justification for using business norms
and conduct rests on a definitional argument. Since contract is based on
language, if we can expand the definition of language to include custom
7

• The decision to recognize norms in the formulation of law can arise in other contexts as well.
In deciding negligence questions in tort law, a court may look to operative norms to determine whether
conduct is negligent. See Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The TheoiJ' and HistOJ)' of
Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. I, I (1992).
75
Ben-Shahar, supra note 6, at 786.
76
Parisi, supra note 55, at 572.
77
David V. Snyder, Language and Formalities in Commercial Contracts: A Defense of Custom
and Conduct, 54 SMU L. REV. 617, 617-18, 629-30 (2001).
78
I d. at 632.
79
ld. at 617-18.
8
Coffey, June 28, 2003 Ecmail, supra note 63.
81 Id.
RZ Snyder, supra note 77, at 618.
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and conduct, then it, too, should be given effect. Implementation of
custom can then be justified in assent-based terms since "[n]onverbal
conduct may be a better indicator of assent than verbal conduct. " 83
The linguistic defense for including commercial nonns is implicitly
based on the justification that if the parties' bargain includes noncontractual practices, the practices must be wealth-improving. If the
bargain includes both the express contract and the trade usage, then
presumably enforcement ofboth will improve the parties' wealth.
This Article argues that we would be more secure in our assessment of
whether incorporation of business norms advanced wealth if we better
understood the goals of the pariies and how certain obstacles can prevent
the development of a complete contract that can achieve those instrumental
goals. The effort to subsume custom and conduct under the large umbrella
of the word "language" does not fully address whether the law should use
this fonn of express communication (nonverbal conduct-based) to modify
or interpret the express contract terms. Deciding that issue requires that
courts advert to the central issue of why the parties tailed to include the
usages or nonns in their express contract (stmctural barriers), and when the
conditions are ripe for the pariies to self-enforce the privately developed
usages. Whether the law's supplying them through incorporation would
serve the instrumental goals of maximizing welfare for the parties depends
on assessing these matters.
III. CLARIFYING THE SOURCE AND TYPES OF BUSINESS NORMS

This Part will outline a stmcture for clarifying the meaning and the
source of nonns. Without that clarification, resolution of the central
question of whether intervention by the government will be needed to help
the parties achieve their desired goals to implement trade norms will
remain clouded.
Clarification should first illuminate whether the nonn is the source of
and "input" that forms the basis for the governmental intervention. A
statutory nonn that developed in the wake of a governmental intervention
in the form of a law would not be an input for a governmental intervention
but would itself be the product of the intervention. 84 A governmental
intervention requiring by statute that a corporation be governed by the
Board of Directors rather than by individual shareholders would then lead
to a statut01y norm that was itself the product of the legislation. 85
!d.
E-mail from Professor Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School
(June 27, 2005,2:52 PM) (on file with Connecticut Law Review) [hereinafter Coffey, June 27, 2005 Email]. I am grateful to Professor Coffey for clarifying this distinction.
85
!d. Of course, in some instances, there is an interaction between nonns that pre-date the
passage of a governmental prohibition (inputs) and a governmental intervention in the fonn of a statute.
83

84
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In other cases there are norms that precede any govemmental
intervention by statute or common law and these would constitute a
different type ofnonn, an input that would affect the decision to intervene.
Since such norms may exist in different settings, a govemmental decision
to intervene in some fashion will depend on a comparison of the utility and
cost amongst these different types of norms for achieving the parties'
overall goals (such as welfare improvement). These norms are one type of
institution that may shed light on how costly enforcement is likely to be. 86
Since enforcement is a component of the costs of transacting, it is
important to pay attention to the means of enforcement, both fonnal and
infonnal, and to the degree to which the means of enforcement are worldng
effectively. 87
Economies will prosper when the costs of contract
enforcement are low and conversely, economies will stagnate when
enforcement costs are high. 88
Norms can consist of "private compulsions," or norms or morality that
develop without interactions with others and are not a result of a bilateral
give and take. 89 One could as an individual be predisposed to act or refrain
from acting in certain ways as a result of biological or cultural influences. 90
The predispositions could arise spontaneously. Altematively, some of
these compulsions could be taught, as in a family or tribal setting. A
compulsion persists if it constitutes a "maximum of cohesive social
behavior that smvives the test of time." 91 Those that survive over time
"must necessarily be, or are in the process of becoming, rational: they
serve the fitness needs of those who unintentionally created them." 92
. Sometimes individuals will react to the "manner in which their
environment represents itself.'m As a result of each individual reacting to
the environment in a similar manner, substantive rules along with
pmiicular means of enforcement may develop. 94 When these norms or
rules are violated, then often the individual's own conscience serves to
self-sanction, obviating the need for govemmental enforcement. SelfIn some cases the passage of a statute may strengthen a pre-existing norm and unleash norms of
enforcement by empowering people to become unpaid norm enforcers. See Robert E. Scott, The Limits
ofBehm,ioral Theories ofLaw and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1613 (2000).
86
See NORTH, supra note 36, at 33 (discussing different means of enforcement as "institutional
constraints").
87
See id. at 54 (pointing out that effectiveness in enforcement varies and that such variations
contribute to differences in transaction costs).
BB Jd.
89
See supra note 83.
90
Vernon L. Smith, Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics, 93 AM. EcoN. REv.
465,469 (2003).
91
!d. at 470 n.19 (2003).
92
!d. at 471.
93
HAYEK, supra note 24, at 45.
94
The peculiarities of a market of fish wholesalers whose product (fish) could quickly deteriorate
in value helps to explain the wholesalers' avoidance of judicial enforcement of their sales contracts
where such courts could not "assure transactional security" given the time constraints under which the
fish wholesalers were operating. Richman, supra note 43, at 2343, 2366.
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enforcement may also occur when "people impose constraints upon
themselves"95 because of the fact that parties are living in primitive or
tribal or other close knit-societies characterized by parties having "a great
deal of knowledge about each other and [being] involved in repeat
dealings. "96 In those cases, defection or opportunistic behavior is unlikely
to occur because in such cases, parties are better off complying with the
norms of behavior. "[F]ormal contracting does not exist" in such groups. 97
When the temptation to defect increases, other norms or informal
constraints could arise as a result of interactions between transactors to
temper such behavior. Some may arise through an overture and response
by transactors in the context of an exchange. Other types of infonnal
constraints may result not from response and overture as in a tit-for-tat but
as a spontaneous effort to lower certain costs of exchange, such as
measurement costs. 98 One such informal constraint/device would. be
standardized weights and measurements without which parties would
devote "excessive resources to measurement" costs or perhaps discourage
. 99
. fr om contractmg.
parties
In the context of such exchanges, we will first assume there are
common assumptions that one can make about the parties' goals.
In a modern society based on exchange, one of the chief
regularities in individual behavior will result from the
similarity of situations in which most individuals find
themselves in working to earn an income; which means that
they will normally prefer a larger return from their efforts to
a smaller one .... 100
At the same time in exchange transactions, in which parties are
engaged in commerce or production and interacting with others, the
potential exists that parties will relentlessly pursue their self-interest and
act in opportunistic ways at the expense of the other party. Despite this
potential, parties in tight-knit settings may develop cooperative wealth
maximizing norms that will contribute impmiantly to social order 101 while
at the same time shielding the parties from the coordination, negotiation,
and administrative costs necessary if they had to solve their problems by
individually negotiated contracts. 102 Many of these norms arise because of
the possibility that defections by one party will be resolutely punished by
95

NORTH, supra note 36, at 36.
!d. at 55.
97 !d.
98
!d. at 41.
99 !d.
100
HAYEK, supra note 24, at 45.
101
See ELLICKSON, supra note I, at 168.
.
102
See Richman, supra note 43, at 2357 (calling such costs "prohibitive").
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103

the other party; hence the terms "overture" and "response" to describe
such practices. The likelihood that parties will actually have to resort to
punishments against deviants in such tight-knit settings may be very slim.
The success of such institutional responses may in fact preclude the need to
resort to sanctioning as parties will be aware that the consequences of
deviant behavior will be swift and effective and far-reaching, given all of
the potential social and business consequences of non-compliance.
The other non-governmental means in which parties can achieve their
goals is the collective intervention of a non-governmental body such as a
merchant group that both develops rules and enforces them. Modem
examples include the FASB and NASD for policing the accounting and
securities industries. These collective institutional responses develop
partially in rer;;ponse to the problems of information-that it is difficult and
costly to know information about the behavior of other parties. Whenever
such information is unavailable or costly to acquire, institutions of some
kind are going to be required because "self-enforcing cooperative
solutions" 104 will only be possible when that information is available.
Institutions may have advantages over the individual sanctioning process.
First, institutions become repositories of infonnation about past behavior
of merchants that makes it less costly for the participating transactors to
acquire information about past opportunistic behavior. Second, without a
collective means of punishment, enforcement might not be achieved.
Individual merchants might decide to trade with an offending party even
after that party had engaged in opportunistic behavior because he could
secure favorable terms for trading, even though everyone would be better
off if all parties participated in a collective punishment action. In these
kinds of circumstances a collective intervention may be necessary to
"provide incentives for those individuals to carry out punishments when
called on to do so." 105

N.

WELFARE MAxiMIZATION AND TWO lLLUSTRA TIONS FOR PRIVATE
STRATEGIES TO ACHIEVE WELFARE MAXIMIZATION:
SOCIAL COOPERATIVE NORMS AMONG CATTLEMEN IN SHASTA COUNTY
AND THE MERCHANT GUILD

This Part will first examine the substantive explanation for why
rational actors will seek to control opportunism and promote cooperation to
maximize welfare. It will then look at private means that parties can use to
achieve such goals in the hypothetical prisoner's dilemma. Two empirical
103
104

1os

See ELLJCKSON, supra note I, at 164-65 (discussing a tit-for-tat strategy).
POSNER, supra note 35, at 57.

Id.
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cases will then demonstrate how the parties' drive to promote cooperation,
control defections and achieve transactional security is accomplished
outside a legal fi:amework. 106 In the first example, involving Shasta
County cattlemen, parties operated almost totally outside of the law
through social norms. 107 In the other case of the medieval merchant guild
parties responding to the absence of state courts and strong legal
authorities devised merchant guilds and other private institutional
stmctures to enforce contracts, secure commitments and promote trade and
·
security. 108
In a subsequent Part, the Article will draw on these empirical examples
to identifY the stmctural factors that make infom1al enforcement of
substantive nom1s possible. It then proposes a taxonomy for judging
whether and when courts can improve welfare by incorporating trade
usages in commercial contracts.
A. The Substantive Norms of Cooperation: The Key Problem for

Contractual Players and Others

Before looking at the trade usages and norms in contractual settings
and the role that the state should play in enforcing trade usages, it would be
useful to look at the basic problem that pmiies have when dealing with one
another in a variety of settings to observe what kind of substantive norms
evolve and what functions they serve. The section will then address the
separate issue of detennining who enforces such substantive norms, after
examining alternative mechanisms for sanctioning deviations from the
nonns, their effectiveness, and the conditions that make pmiicular types of
self-sanctioning mechanisms or stmctures cost effective.
1.

The Prisoner's Dilemma: Parties Overcome the Dilemma by
Private Tit-for-Tat Strategy

One problem that parties face is the potential that one party might
defect and lower the gains from trade that would result from
110
cooperation. 109 It is a key assumption that in this prisoner's dilemma,
both pmiies would be better off by cooperating. Yet, if each party pursues
rational self-interest in a series of decisions in which he is unsure about the
choices of the other party, mutual defection would result, "an outcome ...
106
See Richman, supra note 43, at 2329 (discussing the need for "transactional assurance" as
opposed to contractual assurance).
107
They do, in rare cases, resort to the law to settle cases involving collisions on the highway
between cars and cattle. ELLICKSON, supra note l, at 94 (exploring factors associated with the
legalistic approach to such collisions).
108
Greif et al., supra note 34, at 746, 758, 771-72.
109
See Drxrr, supra note 36, at l.
110
The prisoner's dilemma is often illustrated by the "example in which two, separately confined,
prisoners accused of a joint crime each had to decide whether or not to confess .... " ELLICKSON,
supm note 1, at 160 n.l4.
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worse for both players than [if] ... they would have obtained had both
[c]ooperated." 111 The prisoner's dilemma examines how one player would
likely react to another player, given certain assumptions, including the
inability to communicate with each other beforehand. 112
Despite the potential of maximizing gains from trade, the rational actor
theory and game theory suggest that parties will pursue their own selfinterest relentlessly, even if that results in fewer overall gains from trade.
Game theorists, who analyze how parties are likely to act, predict that "the
rational pursuit of self-interest seems destined to be an engine of
Hobbesian impoverishment rather than of welfare production." 113
However, such theorists suggest that the results in practice are the
opposite; the parties often cooperate at times when the prisoner's dilemma
theory might suggest that they would "rationally" pursue a strategy that
yields fewer gains from trade. 114
The key to overcoming the mutual defection outcome and achieving
cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma rests on the possibility of repeat play
and access to information about the other party's past behavior. 115 If one
player has information about another pmiy's past oppmiunistic behavior,
then that player can, if repeat play is contemplated, punish the
uncooperative behavior in future rounds. The party who threatens to
punish defections engages in a tit-for-tat strategy. 116 This strategy actually
encourages cooperation because it signals to the potential non-cooperator
that the gains from bad behavior will be reduced in the future as a result of
past bad behavior. Thus, each pmiy lmows there will be fewer gains in the
future once bad behavior is revealed and, therefore, the pmiy will have an
incentive to cooperate from the start. 117
This model of the repeat play game, in which parties resort to tit-for-tat
strategies to punish the non-cooperative player, encourages cooperation
without the intervention of the law. These norms arise through the
interaction of players. If one party defects, the norm is to punish that
behavior immediately but to resume dealings subsequently. The prisoner's
dilemma is an example of an overture and response mechanism that arises
when there is interaction between parties. It contains insights for
identifying situations in which parties can effectively secure cooperation
and punish defections on their own. It may also be useful in explaining the
substantive norms of cooperation that evolve in the context of contractual
relationships. "It further helps to identify the relevant criteria for evaluating
111

!d. at 161.
!d. The only form of communication is making an actual choice. !d. at 159.
llJ Jd
114
See id at 167.
115
!d. at 164-65.
116
!d. at 165. "As [A.,'{elrod] presented it, tit-for-tat is a second-party system of social control. It
is a strategy that is simple for a player to administer and for an opponent to recognize." !d.
117
See id.
112
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and comparing (1) the likely costs of and potential for successful
achievement of the parties' goals through completely private reputational
sanctions administered through a tit-for-tat strategy with (2) the conditions
necessitating and facilitating private institutional enforcement (the
merchant guild example) of norms with (3) the cost of a legal system
enforcing a private substantive cooperation norm.
·
2. Shasta County: Achieving Welfare Maximization Goals Through
Social Norms Outside of the Law
Parties can achieve cooperation and punish deviant behavior through
the development of neighborliness norms in a closely-knit community by
utilizing information about another party's behavior to punish noncooperators.
Bob Ellickson's study of Shasta County cattlemen
demonstrates this cooperative norm development. 118 It is a real world
example of an input 119 developed through interactions.
The incentive to develop particular substantive norms arises from the
fundamental assessment that "people by nature want more satisfactions." 120
In any setting involving multiple parties who are interested in maximizing
their own welfare, members of closely-knit social groups will "encourage
each other to engage in cooperative behavior" as a way of maximizing total
welfare. 121 If parties fail to cooperate, there will be fewer total gains from
trade, 122 resulting in "deadweight loss[es]. " 123
The norms developed in Shasta County among cattlemen were
cooperative and therefore welfare-maximizing. 124 Because the cattlemen
were involved in the production of cattle, one can assume that their norms
118

See generally, ELLICKSON, supra note l.
See Coffey, June 27, 2005 E-mail, supra note 84.
120
ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 170 (reflecting utilitarian theory of value maximization).
121
Ellickson refers to norm makers maximizing welfare rather than utility since evidence of
personal tastes is not available to the norm maker. !d. at 167, 171-72.
122
See id. at 167 (describing how informal social norms encouraging cooperation will maximize
welfare).
123
!d. at 172.
124
In most cases concerns about one's reputation would be effective in securing compliance. This
was especially true because neighbors could count on a variety of other interactions with each other. If
one's reputation were sullied by failure to adhere to the norm requiring one to control one's livestock,
one would be likely to suffer in other types of dealings. They would also be induced to comply
because of the likely "average reciprocity of advantage." !d. at 55. One would be induced to comply
not only because of negative consequences from deviating, but also because one would directly benefit
from the norm when in the position of being a victim rather than the perpetrator of the trespass.
When norms of the kind described by Ellickson are involved, they are developed by parties in the
society (Ellickson describes them as "third party enforcers"). !d. at 231-32. There is no actual
bargained-for agreement that demonstrates that a norm would make both parties subject to it better off.
Nonetheless, there are indications that individual parties do subjectively value the norms because they
may be willing to offer services for cooperative behavior from another neighbor. The evidence that
parties in certain social settings are driven to develop welfare-maximizing norms is hard to prove when
there are no contracts to evidence those parties consider themselves better off. The way that one is
assured that a transaction is optimal is that the willingness to enter the deal signals a determination that
the deal has increased each person's utility, based on subjective preferences as they are revealed in the
terms negotiated. See id. at 171-72.
119
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included what steps to take to control errant cattle or maintain cattle
125
boundary fences, as well as how to enforce the practices would arise or
be designed to increase "shareable welfare." 126 A number of such
cooperative norms existed. ·For example, adjoining landowners shared the
127
Each bore responsibility for the
cost in proportion to the livestock kept.
acts of wandering cattle but also "put up with ('lump') minor damage
stemming from isolated trespass incidents." 128
The cost norm that made adjoining landowners responsible for sharing
the costs of a boundary fence presumably made both parties better off.
Each secured the advantages of a fence often by shouldering less than the
full cost of the fence. 129 The norm also saved contract negotiation costs. 130
The norm that made livestock owners responsible for the acts and damage
of their animals clarified the liability issue and protected neighbors from
the persistent ravages of errant cattle. In the case of isolated cattle
trespass, the neighborly norm suggested that parties tolerate the behavior.
Because the risk of such trespass was thought to be relatively symmetrical,
"if victims bear all trespass losses, accounts balance in the long nm." 131
Parties thereby saved the costs of lawsuits to settle disputes. Although one
cattleman might suffer by reputational sanction if he had cows that
trespassed, in other cases, he would benefit because a trespass by cattle of
other cattlemen would subject that owner to a similar reputational harm.
Cattlemen had a variety of other neighborly sanctions to apply when
one neighbor deviated from a norm. When cattle trespassed, a neighbor
with the facts called to alert the owner and offer assistance in rounding up
the cattle. 132 Cattlemen also resorted to "truthful negative gossip" and
relied on concerns about harm to one's reputation to induce adherence to
the norm. 133 If lesser self-help sanctions such as gossip were not effective,
parties could resort to a graduated spectrum of self-help sanctions that
included "herding the offending animals to a location extremely

125

See ELLICKSON, supra note I, at 126-27 (identifYing "controllers that may be sources of both
rules of behavior and sanctions that back up those rules").
126
!d. at 170.
127
See id at 25-28 (explaining the "benefits and costs of boundary fences"). Under the
proportionality norm espoused by Ellickson, "adjoining landowners ... share fencing costs in rough
proportion to the average density of livestock present on the respective sides of the boundary line." !d.
at 71. In reality, the costs of close monitoring of the livestock caused them to resort to '"focal point'
allocations of fence costs, such as fifty-fifty, all-or-nothing, you-materials/me-labor." !d. at 72.
128
!d. at 53. "The neighborly response to an isolated infraction is an exchange of civilities." !d.
129
The all-or-nothing rule would sometimes require ranchers to bear 100% of the costs "when an
active rancher's pasture abuts a ranchette whose owner has few or no livestock; in these situations the
proportionality norm requires the rancher to bear all the fencing expenses." !d. at 72.
130
!d. at 246.
·
131
Jd at 54.
132
!d. at 53.
133
Jd at 57.
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134

inconvenient for their owner."
Violence to the cow was resorted to if
other lesser self-help sanctions failed. 135
Although some cattle owners resorted to complaints to public
authorities, informal norms more often governed behavior. 136 Claims for
monetary compensation were rare. 137 Instead, there was a norm of
refraining from pressing claims for compensation and in most cases this
policy of restraint "live-and-let-live" saved "the costs of going through the
formal claims process." 138 Moreover, "[a]djoining landowners who
practice the live-and-let-live approach are both better off whenever the
negative externalities from their activities are roughly in equipoise." 139
Because the cattlemen tormed a tightly knit non-hierarchical social
group, they successfully developed and informally enforced these nonns. 140
To prevent welfare losses they were motivated to encourage cooperation
while trying to minimize the transaction costs (including the transaction
costs of enforcement).
Other structural factors contributed to the development and successful
enforcement of the norms themselves. These included: the availability of
information about the norm (advertising what the nom1 is), consensus and
means of detecting defections and publicity about such behavior. 141
While the reputational and informal enforcement of social norms
developed by cattle owners were largely effective without legal
enforcement, there were instances in which the reputational sanctions were
not effective and there were deviants from the social norms. Deviance
might take many forms including the behavior of failing to control
animals; such deviants might be impervious to concerns about reputation 142
or they might be less susceptible to neighborly pressures because of the
shorter duration of relationships with the victims. 143 To control such
deviants, a graduated system developed that went beyond informal gossip
and social punishments. The punishments included legal means both
through reporting violations to relevant authorities and actually instituting
. fior compensatiOn
. agamst
. of~1.enders. 144
1awsmts
Reputational sanctions may be less effective in inducing compliance
when disparities in how many cattle individual ranchers own exist and the
134

!d. at 58.
!d. at 58-59.
!d. (noting that ranchette owners are more willing to report trespass incidents to public
officials).
137
!d. at 61.
IJB fd.
139 !d.
140
See id. at 168.
141
!d. at 180.
142
!d. at 56.
143
!d. at 56-57 (explaining how "traditionalists" do not put as much stock in neighborliness as
compared with "modernists").
144
!d. at 57.
135

136
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145

risks of harm are not symmetrical.
A rancher with only a few cattle
146
He
might not see how the "live-and-let-live approach" would help him.
might suffer many incursions and significant damage but since he owns
few cattle of his own, he would not benefit from the "live-and-let-live"
approach. The norm will redound mainly to the benefit of cattlemen with
large herds and the small cattle owner will suffer without having that many
cattle of his own that could benefit from others having to allow his cattle to
trespass.
For these cattle owners the lack of equality in ownership would dilute
the incentive of large herd owners to comply with cattle control against
smaller, ranchette owners who could not retaliate for a nonn infraction by
letting their own large herd run loose. To account for that diluted incentive
a particular norm arose of creating mental accountings of infringements
that could be traded off against other inter-neighbor transactions. 147 If A
has been the victim of many cattle trespasses, then he could expect another
neighbor to contribute to erasing this deficit in the account by acting in
other ways that benefit the injured party who lacks a reciprocal opportunity
to have his cattle wander. The perpetrator could, for example, contribute
to A's volunteer fire depmiment service requirements. 148
3. A Private Alternative to Deterring Deviant Behavior: The
Institutional Response of the Medieval Merchant Guild
An awareness of how informal norms can evolve to solve problems,
achieve cooperation, sanction non-cooperative behavior and achieve
effective enforcement in closely-lmit groups without the intervention of the
law, suggests that enforcement of norms need not always be judicialized. 149
However, in some settings the punishment of defectors through the
possibility offuture dealings and reputational sanctions (iterated play in the
prisoner's dilemma) may not be effective in maximizing gains from trade.
Instead, a formal, collective institution may be needed to achieve the
parties' goals. When there are significant threats of conduct by one party
that would discourage trade and reduce gains, and "undermin[ e] the

145

Cf id. at 54 (explaining that the presence of symmetrical risks will balance accounts).
Id. at 55.
Id. (discussing norm of"mental" accounting trading off and "keep[ing] track of minor losses"
for an eventual accounting).
148 Id.
146
147

149

Scott, supra note 13, at 861. Moreover, judicial non-enforcement of such norms might be
preferred by the parties in cases where judicial enforcement undermines the informal norms
themselves. Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, I 03 COLUM. L. REv.
1641, 1645 (2003) ("[L]egalliability can increase moral hazard and it may also 'crowd out' the parties'
self-enforcing mechanisms."). See inji-a Part Vll.A.3 (suggesting that effect of legal liability rule on
moral hazard will depend on nature of liability rule, purpose it serves and context in which it is
applied).
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foundations of the market economy . . . countervailing power" may be
needed. 150
The medieval merchant guild, a private institution in which parties
devised an institutional enforcement solution outside of law to enforce
contracts, control deviant behavior and promote cooperation, constituted
one such collective, institutional response to a potentially serious
problem. 151
In medieval Europe, to encourage trade, a ruler would pledge not to
appropriate merchants' property. 152 However, once trade was established
and the merchant incurred substantial sunk costs, the ruler was tempted to
renege on his commitment and appropriate merchant property "by using
his coercive power." 153 In fact, rulers regularly reneged on their pledges
and appropriated the property of individual merchants and subcategories of
merchants. 154 Thus, contractual arrangements (the pledge) in and of
themselves were not adequate to curb opportunistic behavior and allow
trade to expand to its optimallevel. 155
To discourage such behavior by rulers, individual merchants could rely
on a number of mechanisms. The repeat play of the prisoner's dilemma
suggests that rulers concerned about possible future punishment by
merchants and the loss of trade would be deterred from appropriating
merchants' property and other similar acts. 156 However, the ability of
individual merchants, or a small group, to effectively deter opportunistic
behaviors by using threats of a loss of future trade, was limited. 157 They
could engage in bilateral reputation mechanisms in which merchants who
were victims would sanction the offending ruler by withholding trade from
the trading center of the opportunistic ruler. However, as long as other
merchants still traded with the center, the bilateral mechanism was not
likely to be particularly effective since the loss from any individual
merchant's trade was likely to be inconsequential. 158
Multilateral mechanisms were also likely to be ineffective. In
multilateral trading sanctions, an entire group of merchants reacts to an
abuse by a ruler of a city of one trader. In such cases there would be "a
collective punishment imposed on the city that included participation by
merchants who had not been directly injured. " 159 When the Muslim ruler
150

Greif et al., supra note 34, at 746.
!d. at 748.
!d. at 747.
153 !d.
154
See id at 750-51.
155
!d. at 747-48.
156
See id at 751.
157 !d.
158
Id ("In our formal theory, the reason is that, at the efficient volume of trade, the value of the
stream of future rents collected by the ruler from an individual marginal trader is almost zero and
is therefore smaller than the value of the goods that can be seized.").
159
!d. at 752.
151

152
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of Sicily imposed a 10% tariff against Jewish traders in Sicily, the traders
diverted trade from Sicily, the offending city, to other trading centers. 160
Despite the potential for multilateral trade sanctions, they too are
unlikely to be effective. First, in order for the other merchants not directly
harmed by ruler abuses to participate in a multilateral sanction, they have
to know about the abuse. This knowledge may be difficult to come by. 161
As Avner Greif points out, "[i]nformation asymmetry, slow
communication and different interpretations of the facts among merchants
imply that without an organization that coordinates responses, it was not
likely that all the merchants would respond to the abuse of any group of
merchants." 162 The second problem hindering multilateral mechanisms
was that rulers could continue to ignore the threatened withdrawal of trade
if the trade by the enforcing group was not significant enough. 163
As long as the means of controlling the appropriation danger were not
effective, trade "would not expand to its efficient level. " 164 Merchants and
rulers both needed a method for assuring adequate security; otherwise
merchants would be reluctant to trade in a city. Consequently, merchants
developed institutions such as the merchant guild which imposed
embargoes to secure compliance with contractual commitments (made by
the ruler). These mechanisms made up for deficiencies in the contractual
arrangements and in the bilateral and multilateral mechanisms used to
control the opportunistic behavior of rulers. The merchant guild was able
to provide the security needed for economic expansion. 165
Merchant guilds were able to play that role because they had monopoly
power in their localities. 166 This meant that merchants associated with the
guild could count on "streams of rents in their hometown" 167 so long as the
merchants followed the guild's dictates. Thus, merchant guilds were able
to use their collective power to punish rulers who appropriated the goods
of individual merchants by issuing embargo edicts. The guilds "all shared
the common function of ensuring the coordination and internal
enforcement required to surmount the commitment problem [of rulers] by
permitting effective collective action." 168 Those merchants who disobeyed
the embargo would be subject to sanctions and possible expulsion from the
guild and would lose the income generated by being a merchant in good

!d.
!d.
162 !d.
163
!d. at 752-53.
164
!d. at 748.
165
See id. at 760.
166
See id. at 757.
167 !d.
168
!d. at 748.
160
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standing.
That would ensure ruler compliance because the threatened
withdrawal of trade by the guild would be significant.
The story of the merchant guild and its function in overcoming
opportunistic behavior of rulers is instructive for several reasons. First, the
guild effectively enhanced trading and allowed it to expand to the optimal
level. It benefited both rulers and merchants, which may have explained
the rulers' willingness to establish merchant guilds in their trading
centers. 17 Further, the guild, an administrative mechanism that operated
through enforced embargoes, effectively discouraged defections from the
embargo. The guild became a necessary construct after neither pledge
alone (contract) nor bilateral or multilateral reputation mechanisms were
effective in achieving adequate security. 171 Moreover, because the state
was not capable of offering adequate legal enforcement of contracts, there
was the need for some other device that could curb opportunistic behavior
by rulers.
The merchant guild was an administrative apparatus that was
developed by merchants to curb the potential for rulers to oppmtunistically
exploit traders. Unless curbed, the opportunism would harm both rulers
and their cities (who would suffer from decreased trade) and the merchants
themselves (who would have their goods appropriated). 172 The guild
provided an enforcement mechanism by a collective that punished
violations of the contractual commitments extended to merchants. It was
effective in overcoming the weaknesses in alternative devices for curbing
such opportunism, including the simple contractual pledge by the ruler and
the simple bilateral or multilateral reputation mechanism.

°

V. WHEN DOES EXTRA-LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF NORMS OR CONTRACTS
WORK EFFECTIVELY? ASSESSING "STRUCTURAL CONDITrONS"
FOR SUCCESS

173

The development of the infonnally enforced utilitarian norms of Shasta
County and merchant guilds both demonstrate that parties can devise and
use extra-legal enforcement mechanisms to achieve their goals through
collectively-orchestrated and centrally-administered embargo sanctions
that promote cooperative solutions and control opportunism. In the case of
the merchant guild, the parties tumed to a coordinated institutional
structure for enforcement because other means of controlling opportunistic
behavior, bilateral and multilateral reputational mechanisms and legal
remedies, were unavailable or ineffective. In the cattle countty, the parties
169

!d. at 758.
!d. at 746 (documenting rulers' receptivity to merchant guilds).
See id. at 747-49 (explaining superiority of guild over reputational sanctions individually
administered).
172
!d. at 747 (noting possible losses to both merchants and rulers from lack of security).
173
ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 178.
170
171
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developed extra-legal mechanisms for enforcing norms and shunned
reliance on public authorities, presumably because it was unnecessary or
more costly to do so.
However, "neither self-enforcement by parties nor trust can be
174
Moreover, "the returns on opportunism,
completely successful."
Therefore,
cheating, and shirking rise in complex societies." 175
determining whether there is a role for state intervention through legal
enforcement of norms should depend on how effective the private
compulsions are at self-controlling deviant behavior, whether the informal
mechanisms are operative and functioning taking into account the
structural factors that make such informal enforcement possible, how
complex the society is and whether a coordinated merchant organization
exists for disseminating information about and punishing defectors.
Private extra-legal enforcement mechanisms operate through
reputational sanctions. 176 According to Professor Ellickson, the likelihood
of successful informal or formal extra-legal enforcement mechanisms
depends on the convergence of three "structural conditions" that are
"conducive to the emergence of cooperation:" 177 the existence of a "closeknit group"; 178 the presence of accurate information about the past behavior
of their counterparty; 179 and the opportunity to "administer sanctions" by
withholding future business or "retribution" in cases where there are future
opportunities for repeat business. 180 Success of such group norms also
depends on the existence of reciprocal opportunities for sanctioning others
who depart from the norms. Social settings, where power is decentralized,
offer the possibility of many opportunities for sanctioning. 181
The presence of a close-knit social group is a key factor in judging
whether welfare-maximizing cooperative norms will develop. 182 A
closely-knit social group has several characteristics that facilitate the
development and enforcement of cooperation and other such norms
including: "reciprocal power, ready sanctioning opportunities, and
adequate information." 183 On the other hand, members of parties that are
transient populations without a closely-knit group have an increased
temptation to defect because there is unlikely to be any ongoing
174

NORTH, supra note 36, at 35.
!d. This is so even though the parties attempt to control such behavior through trying to
"personalize exchange." !d. at 34.
176
Richman, supra note 43, at 2328 ("The typical enforcement mechanism associated with private
ordering is the reputation mechanism, in which a merchant community punishes parties in breach of
contr~~~ by denying them future business.").
ELLICKSON, supra note I, at 178.
178
!d. at 177-78.
179
!d. 180.
180
!d. at 178-79. Although Ellickson explored these conditions in the context of Shasta County,
they are also applicable to and explain the success of the merchant guild.
181
!d. at 179 & n.42.
182
!d. at 167.
183
!d. at 181.
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relationship that would suffer from future sanctions. If they do not have
adequate information about defections by others, then effective informal
sanctioning by parties also would not be possible.
Because a close-knit social group is often non-hierarchical in nature,
"informal power" is distributed amongst all members of the group, 184
creating a type of "reciprocal power. " 185 "[E]ach member [of the group
has] ... enough power ultimately to punish the worst possible misconduct"
and thus absolute equality of power is not necessary for group members to
be able to achieve cooperative norms. 186 Ellickson's illustrative example is
that if each party had a revolver, that power in itself would be enough to
deter extremely bad behavior by members of the group. 187 It would not be
necessary that each member have absolutely equivalent shooting skills in
order for the power to be considered widely dispersed. 188
A closely-knit group can easily and cheaply transmit information about
past deviant behavior to other group members. In a closely-knit group,
there is a greater likelihood that gossip networks and other such
information transmissiOn devices already exist that can relay
information. 189 Closely-knit groups seem ideally suited to passing on
information to others in the group through gossip about parties' past
behaviors. There are often "interlinkages [that] help members share
information about previous consensual economic and social exchanges." 190
When parties take on the task of sharing information and gossip, the costs
are likely to be less than if a formal information network had to be
established outside the closely-knit group. Reputational monitoring can
work in close knit social groups if there is adequate information about the
way in which another party in the group has acted in the past. If one party
has acted in a non-cooperative way, then another group member may wish
to punish that failure of cooperation. This ihllnediate willingness to punish
defections is described as the tit-for-tat strategy and it is one that can lead
to "strings of mutually cooperative outcomes." 191 The tit-for-tat strategy
can discourage parties from defecting from a cooperative strategy because
they know that they will be punished in future dealings for doing so by a
party who learns of that defection. 192
In these closely-knit groups, power is decentralized so that each group
member has the ability and opportunity to sanction others who deviate
from the norms. Continuing relationships of a social nature or a business
Id at 177. To be able to exercise that power, individuals need personal security. !d. at 179.
!d. at 181.
186
!d. at 179 n.42.
187 !d.
IB-1
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189
190
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Id at 181.
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ld. at 165.
ld at 164.
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relationship may offer that opportunity.
Those members who fail to
cooperate or who engage in bad conduct may be subject to expulsion or
other lesser forins of punishment by individual members or by those
considered "allies." That information is important in allowing parties to
hold out the possibility of "future retribution" for past bad acts. 194
Even beyond the confines of a closely-knit social group, in the context
of impersonal sales transactions, the same phenomenon of sanctioning
defectors or outliers may hold true. A potential purchaser's uncertainty
about a particular seller may be mitigated by reputational monitoring or
information built on past behavior to other buyers and the purchaser may
make adjustments accordingly. Furthermore, the market itself may decide
whether a party has acted opportunistically and will impose its own
sanctions in the fonn of a poor reputation for a deviant seller. If a party
sells an unreliable product, then that information may adversely affect that
party's reputation and future buyers will then demand more guarantees or
discounts. 195
The reputational monitoring device in impersonal sales contexts
depends on the presence of a market to detect past instances of
opportunistic behavior and then spreading that information. 196 Because a
party who behaves opportunistically may wish to sell other products to
other consumers or seek repeat business, concerns about reputation may
deter opportunistic behavior.
VI. A TAXONOMY FOR THE NORM INCORPORATION STRATEGY QUESTION:
WHEN SHOULD THE LAW INTERVENE TO ENFORCE COMMERCIAL NORMS?

The previous parts of this Article have demonstrated that powerful
substantive nonns of cooperation may exist and that parties may
effectively self-sanction or sanction deviations from those norms outside
the framework of legal rules if certain conditions are met. 197 In addition,
markets can use reputation to sanction deviant or opportunistic behavior.
There are many different "methods through which individuals control
themselves and one another." 198 The key point is that rational parties will
select control mechanisms, either by deliberate design or evolution, that
maximize welfare by minimizing transaction costs and controlling the
193

Id. at 179 n.44 (discussing how opportunities for sanctioning differ depending on the nature of
the relationship).
194
!d. at I 79.
195
David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 413
(1990).
196
191

Jd.

ELUCKSON, supra note 1, at 169 ("Because it implies that much order can emerge without law,
it challenges Hobbes and the other legal centralists who have exaggerated the role of the Leviathan.").
Parties rarely resorted to reporting violations to legal authorities. See, e.g., id. at 59 (noting that Shasta
County ranchers prefer "to resolve their problems on their own").
198
ld. at 123.
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"deadweight loss arising from a failure to cooperate."
There will be
more gains from trade to share if parties can curb behavior that minimizes
gains, such as the tendency to defect or engage in other opportunistic
behavior that minimize gains from trade, by self-sanctioning and
reputational informal enforcement (assuming the means for transmitting
information already exist because of an established community).
The fact that there are some tightly-knit communities in which robust
self-sanctioning and reputational controls prevent defections and promote
cooperation almost wholly outside of the law does not resolve what
approach the law should take in different types of settings that might not
share all of the characteristics of those communities. The existence of
norms or private commercial trade usages in communities of traders
suggests one possible answer to the nonn incorporation strategy: the law
should take a laissez-faire attitude and rely on the parties themselves to
sanction deviations from the norms where there is already a highly
developed system of social control (as in Shasta County) or rely on an
already existing institutional structure for doing so. 200
However, the fact that substantive norms and self-sanctioning methods
have been developed by a particular community in particular settings does
not resolve the general question of whether the law should ever intervene
by enforcing a privately developed norm when called upon by one party to
do so. The fact that parties have subsctibed to a practice by following it
does not resolve the question of whether departures from the practice
should be enforced exclusively by reputational or other negative sanctions
administered by the adversely affected party and others who learn of the
defection from the norm.
As a party's personal interest in a nonn varies and the divergence
between one's personal preference and the social nonns grows, the
likelihood of substantial noncompliance is great. 201 Thus, a person who
has followed a norm may decide, because of opportunistic reasons, that he
would like to deviate. If private compulsions do not work to prevent the
defection, forms of outside pressure are needed to enforce the norm. The
community, after being informed of the defection, may bring external
reputational sanctions to bear on the offender either through informal
202
This
gossip or through a coordinated merchant network, if one exists.
Article suggests that the normative aspect of incorporation strategy can
thus only be resolved by examining the particular context in which the

199

Id. at 172.
See supra Part IV.
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See Parisi, supra note 55, at 575 (discussing circumstances for defection, including cases
"[w]hen unilateral defection promises higher payoffs and there is no contracl enforcement
mechanism") (emphasis added).
202 Id.
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trade usages arise to see whether the structural factors, that make informal
enforcement successful, exist in that particular trade context.
The distinct issue at the heart of the norm incorporation strategy is,
considering the myriad of ways that parties have for minimizing
deadweight losses and controlling opportunistic behavior, whether the law
should intervene to incorporate and sanction breaches of privately
developed commercial norms. When the law does so, unless the parties
carefully negate such norms, 203 it is in effect completing an incomplete
contract for the parties. The question of the "power of the state"204 in
private contract is directly implicated and efficiency concerns should guide
that decision.
To determine whether the law should intervene by incorporating trade
usages developed by contracting parties, one first needs a taxonomy that
can help explain the impediments that parties face in negotiating and
policing contracts. Without that understanding one would naturally
assume that the absence of any specific incorporation of trade norms would
signal a deliberate choice that such norms were to remain without legal
effect. The implicit argument might be: if the parties had wanted to legally
enforce the norms, then they would have placed the norms in the contract.
A nonnative justification should start by considering what obstacles (if
any) prevent parties from achieving a completely contingent contract; such
a justification must also explain why the parties themselves may not be
likely to expressly incorporate all relevant trade usages and customs in
their contracts. If obstacles exist, then legal intervention incorporating a
norm as a term would be justifiable as a means of optimizing the presumed
goal of maximizing joint gains from trade but only if legal enforcement of
commercial usages would be more effective and less costly than infonnal
or self-sanctioning mechanisms.
Once the structural impediments to bargaining are fully explored, it
becomes possible to understand that courts should enforce trade norms for
the same reason that they enforce private agreements-to enhance the
parties' gains from trade if legal enforcement of the private trade usages
would be more efficient and effective than relying on the parties to selfsanction or informally police deviant behavior. 205 If the conditions
necessary for informal sanctioning of group norm violations do not exist
(no repeat play, no close-knit group, inadequate transmission of
203

See supra note 12.
Greif eta!., supra note 34, at 745.
205
Parties could also seek to control potential opportunistic behavior by prescreening their
contractual partners, a private non-contractual device that they self-enforce. They could also choose to
exit contract altogether and vertically integrate rather than continue to be subject to frictions with a
contractual partner. They could also choose to avoid legally enforceable contracts by belonging to an
organization with its own set of formal rules, administered and enforced outside of legal sanctions,
perhaps through arbitrators. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 131, 135 (describing alternate forms
of social control including sources of rules and methods for sanctioning).
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information) and if no institutional structure exists for enforcement of the
norms outside the legal structure, then legal intervention through
enforcement would be beneficial, at least in certain types of cases later
discussed.
One must first explore why the norm might have been omitted from
the contract, and whether the nann is welfare maximizing. Then the issue
of whom or what institution should enforce the norm may be addressed.
Under ideal conditions there would be no structural impediments to
prevent parties from reaching reciprocal bargains and complete contracts
that achieve first-best outcomes. Courts could simply enforce agreements
that had been negotiated by the parties.
However, a variety of
impediments hinder parties from achieving complete first-best contracts. If
patiies who are transacting with one another are not able to achieve their
goals on their own through contract, they may then search for other devices
to achieve their goals including the control of the central problem of
opportunistic behavior. 206
A. Taxonomy for Bargaining Problems

The first element that affects parties and makes complete contracting
impossible is the problem of uncertainty. Uncertainty exists both with
respect to (1) uncertainty about the world and events that have occurred or
will o<:;cur and (2) uncertainty about how one's counterparty has behaved
(the adverse selection problem) or will behave (the moral hazard
problem). 207
Opportunism is a facet of human behavior, endemic to mankind that
necessarily complicates contracting. If uncontrolled, opportunism will lead
to a loss in value for the parties. Uncertainty about one's proclivities for
opportunism will prompt transactors to screen for this negative trait.
Parties will try to control this hazard of contracting ex ante so that when
disruptions occur, one is not subject to rent seeking by the other party. 208
When uncertainty regarding the degree of the propensity for deviant
behavior and opportunism exist, the difficulties for contracting are
apparent. If one takes away either factor, complete contracting would be
possible. If opportunism were present but each party knew the exact facts
of the other party's past behavior as well as their propensity to act

106

See WILLIAMSON, supra note 58, at 63.
See id. at 47, 63; E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
School (Feb. 15, 2004,3:10 PM) (on file with Connecticut Law Review).
108
Rent seeking is also referred to. as transfer seeking. Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking, in 3 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 55, at 31,5, 316 ("Transfer
seeking is at best a zero-sum activity in that it simply shuffles dollars among people and groups, and is
negative-sum if traditional deadweight costs result as a byproduct of such activities.").
207
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opportunistically in the future, asymmetry would not be present and a fully
contingent contract would be achieved and priced.
The third element-sunk costs-often occurs in conjunction with the
other two elements and contributes to obstacles in contracting. When
parties invest in assets or knowledge that is specifically tailored to a
transaction and cannot be resold on the market without a loss, they
generate sunk costs. Sunk costs matter when analyzing whether contracts
alone can solve the parties' problems. If parties have no sunk costs, it will
not matter if uncertainty about behavior exists and opportunism is present.
When a contract fails to adequately control moral hazard, and one's
counterparty attempts to exploit a disruption in the relationship, one may
simply sell the investment on the market at no loss. The contractual
inadequacy would not matter, as there would be no adverse consequences.
When all three of these factors converge in contracting relationships,
explicitly reciprocal contracts to control opportunistic behavior will not be
achieved. Thus, the contract alone will not allow the parties to maximize
gains from trade on their own. The contract will not adequately conh·ol
contractual hazards because each party harbors uncertainty about the other
party's propensity for opportunism. It will not be possible to detail in
advance all the myriad forms of opportunism that might take place. If
there were no impediments, frictions or transaction costs, pmiies could
freely negotiate or subscribe to whatever combination of n01ms, contract or
other control mechanisms to achieve their goals of increased cooperation
and welfare maximization. Even simplified solutions-such as a general
clause promising to maximize joint gains-an alternative solution that does
not require unbounded rationality-will not be effective because parties
will not trust such a clause. 209 In the presence of such an incomplete
contract, an opportunistic party will have the chance to hold up the other
party when sunk costs have been invested, as there is no ready exit to the
market.
B. Taxonomy: Implications for Trade Usages

Once these impediments to contract bargaining are recognized, it
becomes possible to outline an appropriate framework for evaluating
whether the law should enforce private business norms.
If parties transacting in an exchange relationship are not able to
achieve their goals entirely through contract, they may still search for
alternative cost-effective private strategies for achieving their goals.

209

See WILLIAMSON, supra note 58, at 63.
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Norms or trade usages may be thought of as private strategies for
achieving parties' goals of welfare maximization. 210 In some groups with
all of the structural characteristics outlined above in Part N (repeat play,
access to information, close-knit group), legal enforcement of such
substantive norms may be unnecessary because the private sanctions
administered by individuals or a group render it superfluous. In cases
where the costs of reliance on informal enforcement may be higher, or
produce a less efficient result, and fonnal enforcement of the norms would
increase the overall welfare of the parties because the court is able to easily
adjudge the presence of opportunism, courts should supplement informal
enforcement mechanisms. The decision should depend on (1) why the
parties did not include the substantive content of the norm in their express
contract; (2) the result of denying legal effect to the commercial nonn
(would refusal to incorporate facilitate or hinder opportunism); (3) the
parties' expectations regarding enforcement; and (4) the role of "unseen
processes" in developing the norms. 211
To decide whether a particular trade usage should be incorporated, one
should first grapple with why the parties did not include the substantive
content of the trade usage or commercial practice in their express contract.
After resolving the sources of incompleteness in the contract on the trade
usage issue, one can address whether the source of enforcement for
violations of the substantive norm should be the courts or the parties, or
some combination ofboth.
The first explanation for the failure to include the trade usages in the
contract is that parties often develop rules "without being able to articulate
them." 212 In addition, they often develop such practices through the
"workings of unseen processes."213 If the parties are not able to articulate
the norm if asked to do so, the likelihood that they would include these
norms within their express contract would be low. However, the fact that
the norms are not included does not tell us much about whether the parties
formed an intention as to whether a court or the parties themselves would
be the exclusive source of enforcement or whether the parties and the
courts would act jointly to enforce the norms. Even if the parties were
aware of the trade usage and could articulate it, there would be several
reasons for not including it that might lead to different conclusions about
whether a court should enforce the business norm.
One reason for not including the trade usage in the contract is that the
parties might conjecture, "Why should we bother to talk about this in a
210
E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School (June 10,
2003,3:52 PM) (on file with Connecticut Law Review).
211
Smith, supra note 90, at 470-71 (noting the possible "intelligence" in norms and practices that
are not deliberately constructed, but that evolve through "unseen processes").
m !d at470.
213 !d.

JUDICIAL INCORPORATION OF TRADE USAGES

2006]

489

214

formal way?"
Since we have encountered this contingency in the past,
and we are certain that it will be dealt with in a certain way, there is no
need to expend resources to actually draft it into the contract. This
transaction cost explanation for the omission might easily explain the
failure of parties to include all possible terms of art, such as the meaning of
"superstore"215 or a "gross" in their contract. The transaction cost
explanation becomes even more powerful if there are a number of trade
usages to deal with a number of possible contingencies, some of which
might never arise. Parties contemplating that possibility would then fail to
include the norms because the transaction costs would not be worth
incurring for lower probability events. Transaction cost explanations for
omission thus might cut in favor of the court intervening to supply the
usage as a way of saving the parties transaction costs.
Another reason for including the trade usage by legal incorporation is
that the parties have come to expect that, under the U.C.C., the court will
give legal effect to the trade usages unless the parties carefully negate
them. Failure to enforce trade usages would upset parties' expectations
and cause a loss to parties who would have negotiated different terms had
they known that a comi would deny effect to the trade usage. They might
have demanded a higher price from the other party were the court to deny
effect to the usage since it might subject them to a higher risk of
oppmiunistic behavior by the party.
Parties' expectations might also cut against legal incorporation. 216
Parties might not want a court to enforce a commercial practice in a
particular case.
Sometimes the parties' expectations regarding
enforcement will clearly be articulated in the nature of the practice as a
legally nonbinding one. In other cases where such direct evidence is
lacking, a court should constmct a model that would allow it to decide
whether the parties would have wanted legal enforcement of the practice.
Modeling those expectations will be more complicated when the trade
usage deals with a practice that governs parties' behavior under the
contract rather than a simple term of art. A party may not have included a
practice because he wanted to hedge his bets as to how to deal with a
contingency in the future. The example that Professors Kraus and Walt
give is of a trade practice of allowing the buyer of a lame horse to return it
to the seller. 217 In some cases, despite the fact that a trade practice exists of
a return policy, the seller might not want a court to enforce the trade
practice. Kraus and Walt explain that, in fact, "every horse seller will
testify that this practice constitutes a legally optional accommodation
214

Coffey, June 28, 2003 E-mail, supra note 63.
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rather than a legally binding obligation."
Kraus and Walt explain the
desire to keep the practice legally unenforceable in terms of the desires to
"invoke their stricter, contractual rights whenever they consider their
contracting partner to be behaving opportunistically."219
There are different ways of looking at the lame horse policy. The first
interpretation is that the trade usage that underlies the lame horse policy is
a slightly different one than the one articulated by Professors Kraus and
Walt. The articulated policy might indeed be that there is a policy of
sellers accepting lame horses back, but that this policy does not apply
when a particular buyer is acting opportunistically and a court decides that
issue. In such cases, the seller will insist on the strict contractual tenns
which did not include a return privilege. 220 Under this interpretation of the
trade usage, a court might admit evidence of the trade usage but find that
since a particular buyer was acting opportunistically, he was not entitled to
return the horse under the usage. A nuanced reading of the trade usage by
a court might facilitate legal recognition of the usage at the same time it
denied a particular party relief, reasoning that he was not protected by a
careful interpretation of the parameters of the trade usage.
One could interpret the omission in a different way altogether, arguing,
as Kraus and Walt do, that the parties wanted to keep the practice (of
accommodating unhappy buyers complaining about lame horses)
enforceable only through infonnal enforcement mechanisms. Therefore,
such practice should be denied any legal effect. However, the fact that
parties may not want practices of accommodation and waivers of their
strict contractual rights to be legally enforced may be because the practice
itself is not designed to curb opportunistic behavior, and thus does not act
in the same value maximizing fashion that norms specifically designed to
curb opportunism do. 221 Moreover, where the practice concerns allowing a
waiver of strict contractual rights, there is the likelihood that parties would
not necessarily want the waiver to be enforced in all cases. Because it is
possible that another party might behave opportunistically, the victim of
such behavior might want to insist on strict contract rights to curb such
behavior. Until a party can discern how the other party behaves in the
future, the party who holds the right to insist on strict contract rights would
be reluctant to relinquish that right for the future and allow the court to
enforce the waiver of strict rights regardless of the future circumstances,
especially where the court might be less informed about opportunism
because there are fewer clear benchmarks for judging it. 222 Where it may
218
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be difficult for a court to ascertain whether a party offering to prove a trade
usage is acting opportunistically in light of the circumstances, the court
should be more reluctant to intervene in the trade practice dispute.
In addition, parties might want to keep accommodation practices
informal, because doing so would provide positive value to the parties-it
would allow the seller to signal to the buyer that he is a trustworthy partner
who will make good in cases of lame horses. Enforcing the practice would
reduce the ability of the seller to signal his trustworthiness. That
interpretation also suggests that judicial enforcement should perhaps be
denied.
The nature of the practice and the purpose it serves might be relevant
factors in whether the judiciary should be a supplemental source of
enforcement. In the case of trade practices that are specifically designed to
deter opportunistic behavior, the purpose of the practice is to provide a
means of the parties overcoming the imperfections that stand in the way of
their achieving a first-best outcome.
Faced with the prospect of
opportunistic behavior in their counterparty, and with the fact that
proclivities for such opportunism are often unknown, parties may seek to
develop trade usages that curb such practices. This is especially true when
one party must incur large sunk costs that make exit impossible or costly.
In these cases, although the type of opportunism may be unknowable and
uncertain at the time of contracting, the parties have not omitted the
practice in order to see whether they honor the custom or not based on
"what is going on in the future," 223 and on whether the other party has
acted opportunistically in such a way that he or she should be denied the
benefit of the usage. In the cases where the court does intervene to enforce
the trade usage, such as in Midwest, Gord and Dixon,224 the trade practice
itself seems designed to curb opportunism and there appears to be no
reason to allow a party to have the discretion to not honor the trade usage.
The structural circumstances are such that a party violating the usage is
acting opportunistically and the court can readily use that as a benchmark.
For example, future circumstances really should not have any bearing on
whether a party is allowed to appropriate the sunk costs in the form of
engineering costs devoted to plastic molds, as in the case of Gord, and thus
there seems to be no reason to make the usage discretionary or optional.
However, agreement on the substance of the norm, with its purpose of
deterring opportunism as a means of increasing joint gains from trade, does
not by itself resolve how the court should treat the norm: either as legally
enforceable or as enforceable only through informal mechanisms.
There are certainly several plausible reasons why the court should
intervene to enforce norms designed to curb opportunism. First, if one
223
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party seeks the court's help, it may indicate that the informal mechanisms
are not working or are not likely to work, since otherwise the party
bringing the lawsuit would not undertake the additional costs of legal
enforcement. If infonnal mechanisms were working, presumably the pmiy
injured would prefer to rely on the least costly mechanisms for deterring
opportunistic behavior.
Second, especially in the case where there may be large scale rewards
to defection, which outweigh the costs to reputation and future business, 225
it may make sense to give the injured party an additional mechanism for
enforcement. In fact, permitting a party to sue when there is a defection
from a trade usage allows a party to develop a reputation for toughness,
which can help cut down on defections where there are large gains to be
made from defection. 226
Third, it makes sense for courts to intervene to enforce trade usages
designed to curb opportunistic behavior, even if courts would be
imperfectly able to identify opportunistic behavior when it occurs in the
abstract. The practice itself serves as a ready benchmark for identifying
the opportunistic behavior. When one recognizes that the main function of
giving effect to many trade usages and practices is to deter opportunistic
behavior, then the oft-voiced objection to incorporation strategy-that it
will "lead[] to misinterpretation of the express terms of the contract"227seems misplaced. The court's role in interpreting a trade usage is guided
by its understanding of the role of the usage in curbing opportunism, and it
seems less about possible errors in translating the express tenns and more
about detecting opportunism-a potentially easier task-made easier by
the benchmark.
C. How the Case Law of Trade Usages Demonstrates the Role of Welfare

Maximizing Norms Designed to Control Problems Not Easily Solved
by Contract
Once the impediments to bargaining that interfere with achieving a
first best outcome are recognized, it becomes easier to outline a framework
for thinking about the incorporation of norms into contracts.
If parties in an exchange relationship are not able to achieve their goals
on their own through contract, they may search for other private strategies
to achieve their goals. Norms may be thought of as private strategies

225
Eric Posner points out: "If a small change in prices occurs-whether to the advantage of a
buyer or a seller-neither party defects, because the gain is less than the discounted value of
continuation of the relationship." POSNER, supra note 35, at 157.
226
Id at 158.
227
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designed to achieve the party's goals in the face of obstacles to express
.
728
contractmg.Many of the cases involving trade usages arising in the context of
assent-based transactions seem consistent with this explanation for trade
usages and norms. 229 These transactions are beset by the structural
impediments, which interfere with completely explicit arrangements.
Consequently, the bargains that are reached cannot solve all of the
problems that the parties face, including uncertainty about the proclivities
for opportunism in one's transacting partner.
Trade usages or norms (as noted above) can act as a private device to
control the detrimental effects of opportunism. Were such controls not
devised by the parties, there would be less gain in the exchange. When
parties were pricing contracts, they would pay less for contractual services
to be furnished by someone whose proclivities for opportunism were
unknown, particularly when the party must incur sunk costs that would
make a costless exit impossible. On the other hand, if that hazard could be
controlled or mitigated through trade usages developed outside of the
express contract, there would be more gain from the exchange to be
divided between the parties. Parties could contract secure in the
knowledge that trade usages would be devised that could be enforced
either through self-sanctions, informal sanctioning, or through legal
enforcement if necessary.
The development of trade usages that function to curb opportunistic
behavior can be seen in a number of different contexts discussed below. In
each of these cases, two parties enter into a contract with lingering
performance obligations that cannot be discharged all at once, As in many
contracts, bounded rationality exists and limits the ability of each party to
judge the proclivities for opportunism that may exist in the other party.
One party (A) often has discretion as to some matter involving
perfommnce, and that discretion could adversely affect the other party (B)
under the contract if the discretion were exercised in an opportunistic
fashion, because the party subject to discretionary choices (B) to be made
by (A) has invested large sunk costs in the project. Unless the discretion
can be constrained in some fashion, (B) may be reluctant to invest ex ante
or to enter into the contract at all. One mechanism for discouraging such
opportunism is for a court to enforce trade usages whose function is to curb
opportunism. The cases discussed seem to be particularly strong cases for
legal enforcement of the trade usages for several reasons. First, there is the
228
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distinct possibility that informal enforcement would not work. The usages
do not arise in small, closely-knit homogeneous communities, so the
structural factors that would both encourage development of the norm and
its subsequent enforcement by members of the community are not present.
Nor is there a strong collective organization that has arisen to
systematically enforce the usages through extra-legal means. Courts
appear ready to enforce such usages where there is opportunistic behavior
on one side that is easy to judge, particularly in cases where enforcement
would not facilitate opportunism by the other side. 230 Third, the cases do
230

Examples of this abound in our case law. In Century Ready-Mix Co. v. Lower & Co., for
example, the court held that a contract without a quantity term was understood to be a requirements
contract in the concrete business, and it refused to apply the statute of frauds to a contract with a blank
quantity term. 770 P.2d 692, 696--97 (Wyo. 1989). In this particular case, the defendant general
contractor refused to accept delivery of concrete that met independent, objective standards of quality
after their school district client ordered them to stop pouring and find a new supplier. !d. at 695. By
forcing the defendant to accept the plaintiffs concrete, the defendant's discretion to reject the
plaintiffs concrete was constrained, and expenditures made by the plaintiff in reliance on the contract
were protected. In Den Norske Bank AS v. First Nat 'I Bank of Boston, the plaintiff was the minority
owner of a loan that was in default. 75 F.3d 49, 51 (1st Cir. 1996). While the defendant wished to
restructure the debt, the plaintiff wanted to foreclose, and the defendant argued that the industry custom
was to grant minority owners veto power. !d. at 52, 56. The court ruled that sufficient evidence ofthis
custom was shown and overturned the lower court's summary judgment ruling in favor of the
defendants. !d. at 59. This ruling effectively prevented the majority owner from using its discretion to
the detriment of its minority partner, and protected the minority owner's interest in the loan. At the
same time, the custom did not create a parallel opportunity for the minority owner to engage in
opportunistic behavior at the majority owner's expense. In Acme Markets v. Wharton Hardware &
Supply Corp., the plaintiff sought to enforce a restrictive building covenant that prohibited the
construction of a "super food store" on adjacent land. 890 F. Supp. 1230, 1234 (D.N.J. 1995). The
defendant was attempting to build a supermarket, and the court ruled that the explicit contractual
language must be interpreted according to the meaning that those in the industry would have accorded
it at the time it was made. !d. at 1243. By interpreting the covenant in such a way, the court protected
the plaintiffs reliance on the covenant, and prevented defendant from opportunistically attempting to
void the covenant by insisting on a strict, formalist reading of the agreement. In New England Rock
Services. v. Empire Pm,ing, the defendant general contractor hired the plaintiff subcontractor to engage
in drilling below the water table on a sewer project. 731 A.2d 784, 785 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999). A trade
usage existed that made control of the water table the general contractor's responsibility. !d. at 788-89.
However, when the plaintiff commenced drilling, the general contractor failed to control the water
table, making drilling more expensive. !d. at 785. Although the contract was renegotiated, in the
plaintiffs favor to take into account the extra expenses, the defendant refused to pay more than the
original price when the drilling was done. Id. at 785-86. By giving effect to the trade usage, the court
constrained the defendant's ability to act opportunistically by shifting the burden of dealing with the
water table onto an unsuspecting driller, when a basic assumption made by both parties entering the
contract was that the defendant would be responsible for the water on the job site. There was no
parallel opportunity for the plaintiff to engage in opportunistic behavior because the defendant had the
best opportunity to gather information about the water table, and since the defendant ran the whole
project, it was also in the best position to control the water table. A further example of courts enforcing
trade usages to curb opportunistic behavior and protect the sunk costs of parties is found in Hurst v. W
J. Lake & Co., 16 P.2d 627,631 (Or. 1932). In Hurst, the plaintiff delivered horse meat scraps to the
defendant !d. at 628. The contract stated that a lower amount would be paid for scraps containing less
than "50% protein." !d. Some of the scraps contained 49.53%, and 49.96% protein, and the defendant
refused to pay more than the lower amount, asserting that the scraps contained less than 50% protein.
!d. The court accepted a trade usage that stated that a protein content of 49.5% or greater was equal to
a protein content of 50%. !d. The parties bargained with this particular trade usage in mind, and the
plaintiff relied on it when it shipped the goods to the defendant buyer. By accepting the trade usage,
the court prevented the defendant from opportunistically refusing to pay full price once the horse meat
had been delivered. Another case involving a dispute over the permissible fat content in meat is A.J.
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Cunningham Packing C01p. v. Florence Beef Co. 785 F.2d 348, 349 (I st Cir. 1986). The court in A.J.
Cunningham relied on the trade usage as expressed in "Guidelines for the Settlement of Fat Claims,"
published by the Meat Importers Council of America, to enforce a contract for the sale of beef. I d. at
349,351. The guidelines stated that a tolerance of0.5% leanness in 85% lean beef would be permitted,
and below that the buyer would have to accept the meat, but would be entitled to a specific reduction in
price. Jd. 349 n.l. If the beef was less than 80% lean, the buyer was entitled to refuse shipment. Id.
The plaintiff shipped beef that tested between 83.5% and 84.7% lean. I d. at 349. During the period
between the ordering and receipt of the meat, the price of beef fell precipitously. Id. The defendant
argued that the plaintiff knew it was shipping meat that was less than 85% lean, and because of this the
trade usages should not apply. Id. at 350. The court rejected this argument and applied the trade
usages. Id. In this case, the decision curbs opportunism by protecting the plaintiff's sunk costs in
shipping the meat, and prevents the defendant from opportunistically refusing the meat when the price
has fallen and a better deal could be had elsewhere. The trade usage also constrains potential
opportunism on the plaintiff's side, by allowing the buyer to refuse shipment of beef less than 80%
lean. The trade usage allows for the fact that it may not be possible to know the exact leanness of beef
in any particular package, but prohibits the seller from sending categorically unacceptable (less than
80% lean) beef. In Haeberle v. Texas International Airlines, the defendant leased aircraft from the
plaintiff. 738 F.2d 1434, 1436 (5th Cir. 1984). Rather than maintain and overhaul the planes, the
defendant simply stored the airframes and parts, a practice that made the aircraft less valuable than they
would have been if they had been used continuously and maintained throughout the lease. Id. at 1437.
The literal terms of the lease merely required the defendant to return the planes in a "zero time
condition." Id. The plaintiff argued that the phrase "zero time" did not refer simply to the same
condition the planes were leased in; rather in the airline industry "zero time" essentially meant "freshly
overhauled." Id The court of appeals reversed the trial court and ordered a new trial taking this trade
usage into consideration. Id. at 1442. This decision constrains opportunistic behavior on the part of the
defendant. Once the plaintiff has delivered the planes to the defendant, it has incurred a massive sunk
cost, and if the trade usage is not enforced, the capital the plaintiff has invested in the agreement could
be greatly reduced by the defendant's behavior. In yet another example of the incorporation doctrine
curbing opportunistic behavior and protecting sunk costs, the court in Thomas v. Gusto Records,
reaffirmed that custom is to be used to clarify any ambiguities in written contracts. 939 F.2d 395, 398
(6th Cir. 1991 ). The court recognized a custom in the recording industry granting a recording artist half
of the fees received when the owner of a master recording licenses the recording to an unaffiliated third
party, absent specific wording to the contrary. Id at "!!97, 402. In this particular case, the defendant
licensed the use of the plaintiff artists' songs to third jllllrties. /d. at 397. The recording contracts were
silent on the issue of what (if any) royalties the artist would be owed from domestic licensing contracts.
Id. at 398. The court accepted the customary term, despite contractual silence on the issue. I d. Doing
so prohibited the defendant record company from opportunistically depriving the artists of expected
royalties, and protected the substantial sunk costs the artists incurred in creating their works.
Courts have also used the same framework of curbing opportunistic behavior when interpreting
cases involving the course of performance. In Cutter Laboratories v. Twining, the defendant managed
a trust that included stock in the plaintiff's corporation. 34 Cal. Rptr. 317, 319 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1963). At the time the agreement was executed, the plaintiff's corporation was "substantially
indebted." Id. The stock had been specifically set-aside in the form of a fixed asset so that it would not
be subject to the risks of the business world. Id. The defendant was given chances to rescind or
modify the agreement over the course of eighteen years. Id. at 320. When the stock split multiple
times and dramatically rose in value, the defendant attempted to rescind the agreement and cash in on
the increased value of the stock. I d. at 320-2 I. The plaintiff sought declaratory relief and enforcement
of the agreement. Id. at 319. The court enforced the agreement. /d. at 326. The ruling prevented the
defendant from opportunistically seeking more than it bargained for by arguing that the parties' prior
course of performance demonstrated that the parties intended that the plaintiff would not bear market
risks, and in return would not be able to take advantage later of market increases. The agreement was
set up so that the defendant could avoid business risk. Id. at 319. The defendant managed to do so, and
then attempted to cash in on the results of the risk it sought to avoid. In effect, the defendant attempted
to place all of the business risk on the plaintiff, while reserving all of the reward for itself.
The court also turned to the parties' course of performance in Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v.
Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772,779 (9th Cir. 1981). In Nanakuli, the court turned to the parties' course of
performance and an existing trade usage in interpreting a contract for the sale of asphalt. I d. The longterm supply contract called for the defendant to sell asphalt to the plaintiff contractor in Hawaii at $44
per ton in 1969. Id. at 777. There was a trade usage in the Hawaiian asphalt trade, which provided that
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not seem to be situations where the parties may have omitted mentioning
the usage because they wanted to await further developments which the
parties themselves, rather than courts, would be uniquely suited to judging
whether the usage should apply in pmticular situations (as might be the
case with practices giving rise to waivers or grace periods).

asphalt suppliers would protect their customers from price increases. Id. at 784. The purpose of the
trade usage was to protect contractors from price increases after they had already bid on contracts
relying on a particular price for materials. !d. The defendant honored the trade usage and protected the
plaintiff from price increases twice between 1969 and 1974. Jd. at 785. In 1974, the defendant refused
to protect the plaintiff from another price increase, and the plaintiff sued. Id. at 786. The court looked
at the course of performance of the two parties, and the usage of trade in the asphalt industry in Hawaii,
and determined that both indicated the presence of a trade usage. Id. at 779. Incorporation of the
parties' course of performance prevents the defendant from opportunistically raising prices after the
plaintiff has already committed to supplying asphalt at a set price. The need to enforce the trade usage
is especially strong in this case because the State of Hawaii refused to allow escalation clauses in state
contracts, subjecting suppliers to tremendous losses if a price increase occurred. Id. at 779. There was
only one other major paving company on the island Hawaiian Bitumuls (H.B.), and one other asphalt
supplier (Chevron); these two worked closely with one another, and Chevron routinely price protected
H.B. Id at 779. The defendant wanted to break into the asphalt market in Hawaii, and the plaintiff
wanted to become a serious competitor for large contracts. Id. The plaintiff relied on receiving the
same sort of price protection H.B. received, and it incurred large sunk costs in doing so. A situation
such as this, where (I) the success of the supplier and the success of the paving company are so
intimately linked, (2) a party refuses to grant price protection in the face of a local custom, and (3) such
refusal goes against the parties' own course of performance, is especially opportunistic.
Courts have also manipulated the doctrine of trade usage itself to curb opportunistic behavior.
For instance, in the case of Foster v. Longo, the court declined to admit a "trade usage" asserted by the
plaintiffs. No. CV990425745S, 2003 WL 1090592, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2003). The
defendant made a settlement offer. !d. at * l. Plaintiffs made a counteroffer. ld. at 2. The defendant
declined, and plaintiffs then attempted to accept the original offer, only to find that the defendant had
withdrawn it. Id. The plaintiffs argued that it was customary for a settlement offer to remain open until
specifically revoked. Id. The court declined to admit the usage, and held that the doctrine of trade
usages could not be used to prove that a contract existed, but instead was limited to helping interpret an
existing agreement. Id. at *3. Had the court decided otherwise, the plaintiffwou1d be able to make a
counteroffer without risking a revocation of the original offer. In effect, the court would be allowing
the plaintiff to negotiate "risk free" once a settlement offer had been made. Another case in which the
court has manipulated the doctrine of trade usages to curb opportunistic behavior is Sweet v. United
States, 53 Fed. Cl. 208, 220 (2002). In Sweet, the defendants conducted experimental medical
procedures involving the use of radiation. Id. at 210. The procedures caused death and severe pain in
some of the patients, and their families sued. Id. The federal government had passed the PriceAnderson Act to encourage research in atomic radiation. Jd. at 211. The Act indemnified institutions
with nuclear reactors from liability and litigation costs arising out of "incidents." Id. at 212. The
government attempted to argue that "occurrence" had a trade meaning in the insurance industry
encompassing only unexpected behavior, and since the defendant's behavior was intentional, the Act
did not apply. !d. at 220. The court rejected this argument. Id. at 221. The court would not apply the
trade usage doctrine to the government, because the government is presumed to use plain language
when enacting a statute, and even if it did not, the trade usage was not in effect when the act was
passed. Id. at 220-21. This enunciation of trade usage principles helps prevent opportunism by forcing
parties to use only the customs of the trade they are engaged in (preventing parties from "borrowing"
terms from trades they are not engaged in), and by protecting their reliance on the trade usage at the
time the contract was negotiated (by not allowing the ex post evolution of a custom to change the
meaning of the contract).
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1. Case Law: Where Trade Practice Admissibility or Exclusion Acts
to Curb Opportunism
In Dixon, Irmaos & CIA, Ltd v. Chase National Bank ofNew York, the
court had to evaluate a business norm that had developed in the banking
community to solve a problem that occurs when one of the bills of
lading-evidencing the shipment of the goods and entitling the seller to
payment under a buyer's letter of credit-is delayed in transit. 231 In such
cases, the custom among New York banks provided that the seller be
allowed to draw down on the letter of credit and receive payment by
presenting an indemnity to cover any losses sustained by a banlc's paying
on the letter of credit without the bill oflading. 232 In Dixon, the seller, who
was the beneficiary of a letter of credit, sent goods to a Belgian buyer who
had arranged with its local Belgian bank to request a New York City banlc
to establish two letters of credit in honor of the seller. 233 The seller then
had the letter of credit confirmed by Chase Banlc. 234 As was customary,
the letter of credit provided that after the bank received the "full set of bills
of lading," the seller could draw down on the letter of credit. 235
Once the goods were shipped, the seller received duplicate sets ofbills
of lading and sent one set by air and one by ship. 236 Because one bill of
lading was in transit and had not arrived by the letter of credit's expiration
date, the seller (through its representative) could present only one bill of
lading. 237 Thus, the seller could not satisfY the technical requirements of
the letter of credit.
However, in accord with trade practice, the seller offered an indemnity
from another bank to cover the issuing bank in the event that there were
any losses associated with its honoring the letter of credit. 238 This action
corresponded with the traditional practice (universally honored by
commercial parties), which provided that if a bill of lading could not be
presented, a seller could present an indemnity to a letter of credit issuer to
cover that bank for any losses. 239
The confirming bank (Chase) refused to accept the indemnity in lieu of
the missing bill of lading, and refused to pay the seller the amounts due
m Dixon, Irmaos & CIA, Ltd. v. Chase Nat'! Bank of N.Y., 144 F.2d 759, 760 (2d Cir. 1944).
Dixon is the subject of a spirited colloquy in the Jaw reviews. See Dana Converse Backus & Henry
Harfield, Custom and Letters of Credit: The Dixon, Irmaos Case, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 589, 594-600.
(1952); John Honnold, Letters of Credit, Custom, Missing Documents and the Dixon Case: A Reply to
Bac!ats and Harjield, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 504 (1953).
232
Dixon, 144 F.2d at 761.
233
I d. at 760.
234
Backus & Harfield, supra note 231, at 595.
235
Dixon, 144 F.2d at 760.
236
I d. at 762.
237
The Guaranty Trust Company acted as a representative who presented the relevant documents
on behalf of the seller. I d. at 761.
238

Id.

239

I d. at 762.
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under the letter of credit.
Chase relied on the technical defense that the
provision calling for two bills of lading had not been complied with. 241
Chase also argued that the decision as to whether to acceptthe indemnity
as a valid substitute was not mandatory, and that the bank retained the
discretion to reject the indemnity. 242
The Second Circuit ruled in favor of the seller. 243 Because the court
accepted the trade usage in lieu of the plain meaning of "full set of bills of
lading[,]" it read "full set" to mean one of the two bills of lading plus the
indemnity. 244 Under the court's reading of the letter of credit, the seller
had complied with the contract provisions and was entitled to payment. 245
In a case such as Dixon, an issuing or a confirming bank may act
opportunistically and the seller, who pays a fee to a bank to have it confirm
a letter of credit, is uncertain about the confirming bank's relative
probability of acting in such a manner. The confirming bank is more
aware of its own proclivities for such behavior than the seller. A
confirming bank may decide to seize upon a technical noncompliance with
the bill of lading requirement and ignore the custom of accepting an
indemnity as a substitute for opportunistic reasons-i.e., to shield itself
from a risk that it undertook by confirming the letter of credit initially. 246
Outside the arguments presented in court, the situation surrounding the
Dixon case suggests that the issuing bank refused to accept the customary
indemnity because doing so would allow them to avoid paying on a letter
of credit in a case where changed circumstances-namely, the invasion of
Belgium-would make it difficult to collect reimbursement from the
buyer's bank in Belgium. 247
Although the case has been criticized as "a frustration of freedom of
contract,"248 arguably the result of the court can be understood as the
court's incorporation of the custom of accepting indemnity as a private
strategy that the parties had developed to address the problem of
opportunistic behavior by one of the parties. When the buyer directed its
Belgian bank to contact a New York bank to issue a letter of credit on
behalf of the seller, the buyer faced uncertainty as to whether and with
what probability the issuing bank would act opportunistically. Because of
that uncertainty, it would be hard to deal with the matter by a fully
contingent contract. The buyer of the letter of credit could not anticipate
240

ld.
ld.
242
ld.
243
ld.
244
ld.
245
ld.

at 761.

241

at 761--62.
at 763.
at 761--62.
at 763.
246
Honnold, supra note 231, at 510--11.
247
ld. at 505.
248
Backus & Harfield, supra note 231, at 598.
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all the various ways in which the bank issuing the letter of credit might act
opportunistically, thus leaving the contract incomplete. 249
In this case, Chase, the confirming bank, may well have chosen to
insist on the strict provisions in the letter of credit because doing so would
avoid a risk that had developed as a result of the German invasion of
Belgium. 250 The invasion may have caused the Belgian bank, which had
dealt with and acted on behalf of the buyer, to lack funds. Thus, if Chase
paid the seller and then-as would ordinarily occur under a letter of
credit-sought reimbursement from the buyer's bank, Chase Bank might
well be unable to collect.
The use of custom shielded the seller against such opportunistic
behavior by the confirming bank. Presumably, the parties ex ante would
want to maximize the joint gains from trade and, for that reason, would
want to mitigate the hazards of opportunism. Otherwise, buyers would be
reluctant to buy letters of credit or sellers would hesitate to accept them
without some further protection against opportunistic action of the issuing
bank. Because of uncertainty about the ways in which the bank may have
a proclivity for diverging or acting opportunistically, the problem will be
difficult to solve by explicit contract. Yet, if the problem is not solved by
contract, the parties will search for or devise other ways of dealing with the
opportunism problem in an efficient manner. In this case, the custom of
accepting indemnities solved the practical problem of delayed bills of
lading and simultaneously insured that the bank could not seize on a
technical failure to opportunistically shield itself from the risk that a
foreign bank, which had taken payment from the buyer, would become
insolvent. The seller's vety purpose in requiring a letter of credit to be
opened on its behalf is to avoid having to depend on the unknown finances
of a foreign buyer. By having a letter of credit confirmed in its favor in a
more convenient jurisdiction by a bank with which it presumably had an
existing relationship, the seller could insure payment readily once the bills
of lading assured a lender of delivery. This confirmation by Chase
protected it against the "difficulty in securing reimbursement from its
Belgian correspondent ... which made its confirmation valuable to the
seller."251

249
This Article is using incompleteness to mean a failure of the parties to provide mechanisms for
controlling behavior that will arise during a contract. There are many ways in which lawyers and
economists talk about the incompleteness of contracts. The issue is complex and goes beyond simply
identirying whether a gap exists in a contract Economists use a different approach to incompleteness,
finding contracts to be incomplete if they fail to differentiate outcomes for particular contingencies
when an optimal contract would do so. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 16 at 190---91; see also
Symposium, Incomplete Contracts: Judicial Responses, Transactional Planning, and Litigation
Strategies, 56 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 135 (2005).
250
Honnold, supra note 231, at 510-11 & n.24.
251
Jd. at 510-11.
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In this particular case, had the Second Circuit refused to admit the
custom and, instead, insisted that the term "full set" of bills of lading had
an ordinary meaning or that the meaning was unambiguous, the court
would have upset a private strategy that the parties had devised for curbing
possible opportunistic behavior that could not easily be dealt with by
contract. 252
In Douglas & Mizell v. Ham Turpentine Co., the plaintiff contracted to
sell the defendant 300 barrels of turpentine and 1000 barrels of rosin. 253
The contract provided that defendant/buyer would furnish the tank cars to
ship the goods within ten days of the plaintiffs/seller's request. 254 Because
the buyer agreed to furnish the tank cars, the seller agreed to sell the
turpentine at a discount of eight cents below the market price. 255 If,
however, the defendant/buyer refused to supply the tank cars when
requested by the seller, the price would be based on the market price ten
days after the written request. 256 Thus, the buyer had an incentive to
supply tank cars when they were requested, otherwise the buyer would not
benefit from the discount. The buyer was obligated to buy the output of
the seller since the buyer "agree[ d] to receive all turpentine ... delivered"
by seller. 257
After the seller had ninety barrels of turpentine for shipment, the seller
requested that buyer furnish a tank car. 258 The buyer declined to do so,
arguing that it did not have tank cars with such a low barrel capacity. 259
Several months later, the seller delivered turpentine to the buyer, more
than half of which consisted of the disputed ninety banels,260 and the
parties disagreed about what price buyer was obligated to pay for the
ninety barrels?61 The seller insisted that the price (for the first ninety
barrels) furnished under the contract was the market price ten days after the
buyer's refusal to furnish tank cars for the ninety banels?62 On the other
hand, the buyer offered a significantly lower price based on the eight-cent
discount.
The court had to parse the contract provision that obligated the
defendant/buyer to furnish tank cars within ten days of the
plaintiffs/seller's request. Did that provision obligate the defendant to
furnish a tank car even if the shipment prepared by plaintiff(ninety barrels)
252
See supra note 58 (describing problems with general form clauses prohibiting opportunistic
behavior).
253
Douglas & Mizell v. Ham Turpentine Co., 97 So. 650,650-51 (Ala. 1923).
254
!d. at 651.
255 !d.
256 !d.
257 !d.
m !d. at 650-51
259 Id.
260 !d.
261 !d.
262 Id.
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was below the normal capacity of a tank car (125-160 barrels)? If the
defendant was obligated to furnish tank cars, regardless of the amount to
be supplied by the seller, then the defendant/buyer's refusal to furnish the
tank car would have triggered the price pegged to the market price ten days
after the refusal. Subsequent events made the market price after ten days
desirable for the seller, but undesirable for buyer. 263
To resolve the issue of how to interpret the plaintiffs/seller's
obligation, the court turned to trade usage? 64 In the turpentine industry, a
tank car bad an understood capacity of 125-160 barrels.265 Because the
contract was silent on the meaning of the words "tank car" and the trade
usage did not contradict the written contract, the court found that the trade
usage should be incorporated into the contract.266
To understand the court's reliance on trade usage and the role trade
usage played in solving problems that the parties faced and maximizing
gains from h·ade, it is important to understand the context of the
contractual agreement.
The parties contracted under conditions of
unce1iainty both with respect to when the seller would be able to produce
the turpentine and in what amounts, the market price at the time that the
seller would demand a tank car, the possible proclivities for opportunistic
behavior by either party, and uncertainties about the particular context in
which such opportunistic behavior might manifest itself.
The arrangement allowed the parties to deal with the unceiiainty of the
seller's production schedule (by allowing the seller to request tank cars as
production occurred), and it benefited the buyer by allowing him to avoid
paying the higher market price if he furnished tank cars in a timely fashion.
However, the arrangement also allowed for opportunism by the seller, who
could request tank cars whenever the price was high.
In other words, if the court interpreted the contract without the trade
usage, the seller could request the buyer to furnish tank cars regardless of
the available barrels. The seller could act opportunistically to exploit high
prices to the buyer's disadvantage by requesting a tank car whenever the
price was high, regardless of how little the production was. Since the
defendant/buyer was obligated to pay the freight charges/ 67 it was
particularly impmiant to the buyer that the seller/plaintiff request only fully
loaded tank cars.

263

264

!d.

Id. at 651-52 ("If there is a general usage applicable to a particular profession or business,
parties employing an individual in that profession are supposed to deal with him according to that
usage. All trades have their usages, and when a contract is made with a man about the business of his
craft, it is framed on the basis of its usage, which becomes a part of it, except when its place is
occupied by particular stipulations.").
265
!d. at 651.
266
!d. at 651-52.
267
!d. at 651.
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The trade usage arguably served to deter the particular form of
opportunism that would arise when the seller would make demands for less
than full tank capacity merely to exploit a temporary rise in prices.Z68 If
the seller could request tank cars for any quantity, then the seller would be
in control of a factor that would allow it to maximize the price charged.
By pegging demand to the capacity of an ordinary tank car, the seller
would only be able to make demands for tank cars as production equaled
that capacity. The seller could still decide to refrain from making demands
and to accumulate the product (in lots of 125-160 barrels) on the hope that
the price would go up. 269 But the seller's effort to exploit that price would
be offset by the chance that the price would go down, subjecting the seller
to a significant loss.
The incorporation doctrine also served to deter opportunistic behavior
and to protect the sunk costs of a television station. In Midwest Television
v. Scott, Lancaster, Mills & Atha, Inc., after the television station (plaintiff)
had run ads for the defendant (ad agency's client), the company client
declared bankruptcy. 270 In this case, because the company was bankrupt,
the ad agency never received payment from the client. The television
station then sued the ad agency to collect for the unpaid bill. 271
Ad agencies procure ad space on behalf of their client companies by
negotiating with television stations. 272 The ad agency and the television
station sign a contract negotiating the price for the airtime and reserving a
specific block of time. The ad agency signs a separate contract with the
client governing the fee arrangement, and acts as the company's agent in
procuring the television time. 273 In the typical case, the station would
receive payment in the following way: the ad agency bills its client for the
airtime, receives payment, deducts its fee, and remits payment to the
television station. 274
The defendant ad agency in Midwest argued that it was not liable for
the airtime because it was acting on behalf of a disclosed principal (the
268

Other forms of opportunism were solved by the contract. Since the buyer was obligated to
take the .turpentine when the seller made a demand for a tank car, the buyer could not simply refuse to
take the turpentine because prices were high. Doing so would obligate it to lose the discount.
269
Thus, if the seller could accumulate 125 barrels and hold on to those barrels until the price rose
again before requesting a tank car, then the seller would have some ability to manipulate the price.
However, that ability would be reduced by the fact that the market price could fluctuate in a way that
would not be favorable to seller (holding on to the product might tum out to be a bad bet), and by the
fact that sellers might need to be constantly receiving and shipping out barrels (in order to receive
payment) and, thus, sellers would not have that much control over the timing of the request of the tank
car.
270
Midwest Tel. v. Scott, Lancaster, Mills & Atha, Inc., 252 Cal. Rptr. 573, 575 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988).
271 !d.
272 /d.
273
/d. at 575-77.
274
!d. at576.
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client).
The effect of the ad agency's disclosure of the identity of the
principal, absent other circumstances, results in a contract between the
client and television station. 276
However, other circumstances dictated a different result in Midwest.
The court found that the contract should be interpreted to include a custom
in the industry under which the ad agency would be liable to the television
station for the unpaid bill of the client/company "absent other prior
arrangements."277 In order to escape responsibility for this customary
means of payment, the ad agency would have been required to opt out of
the custom at the time it entered into the contract with the station, and to
alert the station that it was disclaiming liability. 278 Since no such
arrangements existed and no disclaimer of liability had been made, the
court interpreted the contract to incorporate the custom, making the ad
agency responsible for the bankrupt company's bill.279
The ad agency has direct information about the client and its credit
risks, while the television station has no information. The ad agency could
act opportunistically by concealing this information to sell more
advertising spots. All of the negative effects of this concealment would
fall on the station. Thus, the television station faces uncertainty about the
agency's propensity for opportunistic behavior.
Un<;.:ertainty about the agent's proclivities for concealment makes it
difficult for the principal to control such conduct by express contract. The
station is, in effect, offering discretion to the ad agency to pick the clients
who will advertise on the station. The station would have a difficult time
anticipating the various ways that the agency will exercise its discretion, so
a detailed contract controlling all possible exercises of discretion would be
difficult to achieve. A general clause promising to act to maximize joint
profits might have been possible, but it would likely be disbelieved? 80
Without some mechanism for controlling opportunistic behavior by the
agency, the station would be at risk. Upon entering into the contract with
the agency, the station will reserve specific blocks of time in advance and
presumably turn down other opportunities for those time slots. These time
slots would be difficult to resell if the client canceled. Moreover, once the
ads have aired, the station has sunk costs that will be fu"1 irretrievable loss.
The importation of a trade usage, which renders the ad agency liable
for those sunk costs unless the agency denies any ljability, will deter
agencies from opportunistically passing on the negative effects of poor
credit risks to the station while immunizing itself from liability. The trade
275

Id. at 577.
Id. at 577 n.4.
277
Id. at 579.
278
I d. That disclaimer would have prompted the station to take the appropriate measures to check
out the credit of the third party client/company. I d. at 576.
279
Id. at 579.
276

280

WILLIAMSON, supra note 58, at 63.
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usage is utilitarian, and arguably one that both parties would prefer ex ante.
The trade usage would prevent ad agencies from selling time without
checking and disclosing the credit of the client. Without the trade usage,
stations will be reluctant to enter into contracts with ad agencies because of
the risk of opportunistic behavior, and will either be deterred from entering
such contracts, extract other provisions, or raise prices to protect their
interests in getting paid for their sunk costs.
At the same time, such a trade usage would act as a private device to
overcome the difficulties the station may face in controlling behavior
through express contract. The routine enforcement of trade provisionsmaking ad agencies responsible for payment when their client goes
bankmpt-will curb the ability of the ad agencies to engage in
opportunistic behavior and enhance gains from trade. It will also promote
gains from trade by allocating the risk of nonpayment to the ad agency that
already has the information regarding their clients and their credit
worthiness. 281
The role that the incorporation of trade usages can play in deterring
opportunism can be seen in Gord Industrial Plastics v. Aubrey
Manufacturing. 282 The dispute in this case involved whether the defendant
owed the plaintiff a fee to remove a plastic mold from the defendant (mold
removal fee). 283 In Gord, the defendant ordered the plaintiff to produce a
plastic mold and also agreed to buy plastics from the plaintiff. Such
plastics were to be made from the mold.
Although there was no written contract provision on the removal of the
mold, a trade usage in the industry customarily charged buyers up to 50%
of the cost of the mold for its removal. 284 The court admitted the trade
usage and charged the defendant with the mold removal fee. 285
In Gord, the parties faced the confluence of factors that afflict many
bargaining parties ex ante. A party may face the prospect that its
counterparty will act opportunistically over the course of the contract. The
mold manufacturer does not know a buyer's proclivities for opportunism in
In the plastics industry, the mold manufacturer incurs
advance.
286
considerable expense in time and engineering costs to produce the mold.
81
'
If the television station had been made aware that the ad agency was not assuming the risk that
the purchaser of the airtime would not pay, then the station could have priced the advertising to take
account of that risk. The key is understanding which risks each party assumed. If the station had
knowingly assumed the risk of default ofthe ad agency's client, they would have charged a premium or
might have declined the risk altogether. The trade usage eliminates the ambiguity and insures that the
station will have the information needed for pricing, or it will not be liable at all.
282
Gord Indus. Plastics v. Aubrey Mfg., 469 N.E.2d 389 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
83
'
Id. at 391.
'84 Id.
285
Id. at 392.
86
'
I d. A publication of the Society of Plastics indicated that because molds are quoted at cost and
do not include engineering costs, a trade usage exists to allow the manufacturer to recoup those costs.

I d.
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If the buyer of the mold could retain it, he could produce more plastic parts
from the mold without bearing any of the engineering costs. Such
behavior would amount to opportunism at the expense of the manufacturer.
It is critical that the potential for such opportunism be checked as it
will reduce gains from trade:
If there are such threats regarding what will be received by
any party from the other (and there will be uncertainty
regarding the failing, shirking, or diverting attributes of the
other party), the first best gain from trade is reduced by one
means or another: (I) by allowing unchecked the full effects
of failing, shirking, or diverting or, alternatively, (2) by
engaging in costly preventive efforts, that is, costly private
strategies or costly intervention. 287
The mold manufacturer could undertake the costly process of trying to
screen the trustworthiness of all of his potential contracting partners or put
a mold removal fee into the contract. He could also include a general
clause that would obligate the buyer to act in good faith and to maximize
joint profits, but it is likely that this would not be believed.
The trade usage itself constitutes one means of controlling
opportunistic behavior and maximizing the benefits of the exchange. The
custom of charging the buyer a mold removal fee acts to discourage such
opportunistic behavior. It is in both parties' interest since without the
custom (and its anticipated incorporation into the parties' agreement), the
manufacturer's incentive to engage in the trade decreases as the potential
gain from trade is reduced. He may have to charge the buyer up front for
an amount to represent the likelihood that the buyer will seize the mold. If
the parties could devise a strategy that would control the costs from the
opportunistic behavior and the costs of that strategy were less than the
potential loss from uncontrolled opportunism, the parties would have an
incentive to engage in such a strategy. 288 The trade usage is one such
device that might require legal enforcement if the other means of private
enforcement through private compulsion, reputational sanctioning, or
organizational response are unavailable or more costly. Moreover, because
the criticisms have tended to treat the incorporation doctrine as an all or
nothing strategy, they have failed to assess whether the substantive norm
requires technical expertise or speed in resolution, and whether the conduct
governed by the norm would be transparent to outsiders. All these factors
might affect the efficacy of private versus public enforcement of a business
norm.
287

Coffey, Apr. 30, 2004 E-mail, supra note I.
"What we really mean is that, where the costs of preventive means are less than costs of the
failing, shirking, or diverting prevented thereby, attempts will be made to minimize the reductions from
the first best amount of gain." Id.
288
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Where Legal Enforcement of Trade Usage May Be Problematic

Courts are willing to enforce trade usages when they control
opportunistic behavior, the party seeking to enforce the trade usage is not
behaving opportunistically, and the parties understandably omitted the
trade usage from the contract because of the potential for limitless
specification costs. Courts are also more receptive to enforcing trade
usages where structural factors would hinder private enforcement through
reputational sanction, and other forms of private enforcement (such as
private compulsion or organizational mechanism) do not exist or are
unlikely to work. In the cases in which the court intervenes to recognize or
deny a trade usage in a manner that constrains opportunistic behavior, one
party often retains discretion to make decisions during the performance of
the contract that may adversely affect the other party. 289 The trade usage
itself is designed to constrain an opportunistic exercise of discretion by one
party, often when one party has invested sunk costs that might be
appropriated by the non-investing party. That would have been the case in
Gord, where the non-investing party might have appropriated the sunk
costs in the form of engineering costs for the plastic molds had the court
not applied a trade usage specifically designed to prevent that behavior. 290
In Midwest, the court protected the sunk costs of television stations by
applying a trade usage requiring ad agencies to pay in the event that their
client went bankrupt (unless liability was specifically disclaimed)?91 In
Douglas, the court enforced a trade usage that had arisen to constrain a
seller from opportunistically timing its request for a tank car from the
buyer to insure high prices at the expense of the buyer. 292 In all of these
cases, the structure of the transaction is such that one party will incur sunk
costs unilaterally before the other party performs. Consequently, the
289

Sometimes the decision made by one party that may adversely affect the other does not involve
opportunistic appropriation of sunk costs oi- a clear effort to avoid contractual risks already undertaken.
Instead, one party may have to make a decision (one that could be made negligently) that could expose
the other party to loss. One such example is Provident Tradesmen Bank & Tntst Co. v. Pemberton, 24
Pa. D. & C.2d 720 (1961 ). In Provident, the court applied customary practice (course of dealing) to
impose on a bank a duty to warn a dealer that had guaranteed obligations of a customer. Id at 728.
This warning would allow the dealer to protect himself in the event that the customer dropped the
insurance, and would force the bank to share information so that all parties could maximize wealth. I d.
Otherwise, if the bank does not share information, the dealership c;mnot protect itself and is exposed to
a risk of significant loss in making good on the guaranty. Sharing the information would presumably
be in the interest of the bank as well because doing so would insure that there was insurance to cover
some of the losses, and the guaranty by the dealer would then be available to cover any non-insured
losses.
Applying the course of dealing against the bank would assign duties in such a way as to maximize
wealth. Moreover, there is little reason to suppose that a party would not want the practice applied
because it might risk the other party acting opportunistically, as there might be in the waiver cases
discussed infra Part VlC.2.
290
Gord Indus. Plastics, v. Aubrey Mfg., 469 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
291
Midwest TeL v. Scott, Lancaster, Mills & Atha, Inc., 252 Cal. Rptr. 573, 579 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988).
291
Douglas & Mizell v. Ham Turpentine Co., 97 So. 650,651-52 (Ala. 1923).
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substance of the trade usage operated to the benefit of both parties when
viewed ex ante.
Without some kind of enforcement of the constraint-such as that
afforded by the trade usage-the parties might have to impose a higher
price on the other party to make up for the possibility of uncontrolled
opportunism, or decline to contract altogether. If the court decides that the
strong private compulsions or structural factors that would make informal
enforcement possible do not exist or are weak, then judicial enforcement is
warranted.
In another class of cases, particularly those in which the business norm
is offered to vary the terms of an express contract by conduct amounting to
a waiver, the business practice that is pleaded by one party is often one that
is not expressly designed to constrain opportunistic behavior. Rather, the
practice is designed to vary or excuse some express terms of a contract that
the parties agreed to. These often involve cases where the contract
specifies certain quantities or specific engineering requirements for a
product, and one party seeks to demonstrate that the specific quantity was
only an estimate or that there can be reasonable variation from the specific
requirements. These types of cases are similar to the lame horse case, in
which one party insists on strict adherence to the terms of the contract,
while the other side offers to show a business practice that varies the strict
language. 293 The initial party then argues that the variation is only an
informal accommodation, but one which was not intended to be legally
enforceable.
These decisions have been subject to criticism on a number of grounds,
including a lack of clear guidance to the courts. According to scholars,
courts have made a number of doctrinal errors in applying the U.C.C. law
on business custom. They have incorrectly used the parole evidence rule
to exclude trade custom,294 relied on overly liberal definitions of
contradiction that permitted courts to rationalize as consistent "almost any
usage oftrade,"295 misguidedly refused to admit business custom under the
guise of protecting plain meaning 296 and made the doctrinal mistake of
"equat[ing] inconsistency and admissibility."297
This Article argues that where the usage ac.ts as a waiver of strict rights
rather than an express usage designed to control opportunism (see cases
discussed above in Part VI.C.l), a court may be less willing to intervene
for a number of reasons. First, where the usage takes the form of an
accommodation, the parties may have omitted the practice from the
293

Kraus & Walt, supra note 8, at 208.
Kirst, supra note 6, at 832-36 (discussing misguided effort by courts to exclude evidence of
business custom under tbe parol evidence rule).
295
!d. at 850.
296
!d. at 836.
297
!d. at 842.
294
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contract because they want to await further infonnation and that
information might be more readily accessible to the parties than to a court.
Courts also seem to be hesitant to enforce trade usages when it appears as
though doing so will simply shift the potential for one-sided opportunism
from one party to another, and do nothing to eliminate it. That factor
might explain an unwillingness of a court to admit evidence of a trade
usage requiring just cause modi:fYing an express contract term that
pennitted tennination of the contract on ninety days' notice. 298 In Triple T
Services v. Mobil Oil Corp., the plaintiff operator of a franchised service
station sued the defendant oil company for tenninating their franchising
agreement in bad faith. 299 The plaintiff sought an injunction prohibiting
the tennination of the lease, and argued that there was a custom in the
franchising agreements prohibiting the franchisor from canceling them
without just cause. The court refused to admit the custom. 300
Incorporating the trade usage in this case would not serve the goals of
the incorporation doctrine. The decision in Triple T does leave room for
one-sided opportunistic behavior. As a result of this decision, the
defendant could continue to force the franchisee to incur substantial sunk
costs and end the agreement at its leisure. However, admitting the trade
usage would have done nothing to cure this defect. Incorporation would
simply shift the potential for one-sided opportunistic behavior from the
defendant to the plaintiff. If the trade usage were accepted, the defendant
may be forced to remain in a franchisor/franchisee relationship, even
where there may be good cause to terminate the agreement, if the good
cause is difficult for a court to verify. It is not clear that admitting the
trade usage would serve the goal of maximizing gains from trade either.
Incorporation would at best reduce the cost of opportunistic behavior, and
do nothing to eliminate it. At its worst, incorporation could actually cause
a net loss to contracting parties if the cost of franchisee opportunism
outweighed the cost of allowing opportunism by the franchisor.
In a case such as this, the court may be reluctant to intervene, because
there is no clear way for the court to eliminate potential opportunism, and
the parties themselves are probably in the best position to guard against it.
Another type of case that presents difficulties for a court involves a
party attempting to argue that a quantity specified in a contract should be
treated only as a "fair estimate."301 One such case famous in the lexicon of
trade usage cases is Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co. 302 The focus
298

See TripleT Serv. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 304 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1969).
!d. at 195. The defendant gave notice that it was terminating the lease despite the plaintiffs
"more than satisfactory" performance during the lease period, and planned to open a diagnostic and
repair service center on the site. !d. at 194. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was attempting to
benefit from the good will developed by the plaintiff over the course of the lease. !d. at 195.
300
!d. at 204.
301
Kirst, supra note 6, at 845.
302
Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971).
299

2006]

JUDICIAL INCORPORATION OF TRADE USAGES

509

of the dispute was a three-year contract to sell phosphate at a fixed price.
The contract obligated the buyer to purchase a minimum tonnage of 31,000
tons. 303 After the price suffered a sharp drop, the buyer and seller
attempted to renegotiate the price; however, the price that the seller agreed
to in renegotiation still exceeded the market price. 304 As a result the buyer
305
took delivery of only one-tenth of the contract amount.
The buyer sought to introduce evidence of usage of trade and course of
dealing to demonstrate that the buyer was not obligated to purchase the
stated minimum quantities in the contract. The buyer cited a pattern of
mutual adjustment in which the parties had not adhered to the contract
price or amount but had acted to take account of changed conditions. 306
The buyer in Columbia Nitrogen argued that that pattern of conduct
amounted to a course of dealing that took place in other contracts between
the buyer and the seller in which their roles were reversed. 307 That pattern
of mutual adjustment comprised a trade usage as well. 308 The district court
refused to admit that evidence offered by the buyer, citing the
inadmissibility of such evidence when it contradicts the plain meaning of
the contrace 09 but the district court was overruled and the evidence was
subsequently admitted. 310
The difficulty with cases such as Columbia Nitrogen, in which one
party alleges a business norm that will allow it to deviate from a quantity
specified in the contract, is that parties can seek to deviate from a quantity
specified in the contract whenever the market conditions make such
purchases inconvenient or more costly than purchases on the market. A
buyer could always seek to deviate from whatever quantities were
specified by refusing delivery whenever the buyer could procure the goods
on the market at a below-contract price. The seller would conversely seek
to avoid delivery whenever the market price had risen. Unlike the factual
situations of the cases discussed in Part VI.C.l, where the business norm is
designed to constrain opportunistic behavior and there is little opportunity
for parallel opportunistic behavior by the other party, these quantity
deviation cases are inherently more ambiguous on the issue of who is
acting opportunistically under the contract. In every fixed price/fixed
quantity contract, a purported effort to deviate from the quantity or the
price may involve an effort by one party who would be advantaged by a
deviation from the express terms to reallocate the risks that were allocated
in the contract. Therefore, a court should be reluctant to intervene to upset
I d. at 6.
I d. at 7.
305 Id.
303
304

306
307
308
309
310

Id. at 8.
Id.
I d. at l 0.
I d. at 7-8.
Id. at ll.
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that risk allocation because doing so may well fail to improve welfare for
the parties. This insight into the inherent potential for one party to
opportunistically use deviations from express terms can explain in part
why courts may be reluctant to allow such deviations under the guise of
trade usage or course of dealing or course of performance. 311
In quantity deviation cases where one party alleges that a deviation
from a specified quantity and the nature of the trade usage itself seems to
police the possibility of opportunism, the courts seem more willing to
embrace the use of a business norm to vary a quantity term. For example,
in Michael Schiavone & Sons v. Securalloy Co., where the parties agreed
on the defendant delivering 500 gross tons of stainless steel, the court
actually allowed the defendant to introduce trade usage evidence that
showed "500 Gross Ton" meant "up to 500 tons." 312
In Schiavone, the parties faced the problem of uncertainty about the
availability of steel. This could have led to both parties acting
opportunistically. The buyer could have contracted for 500 tons and
demanded damages when the seller failed to obtain the materials. This
would have given the buyer damages for the seller failing to deliver
materials that both parties anticipated ex ante might be unavailable. Under
the trade usage, however, the buyer cannot demand damages for the
seller's failure to deliver if the seller cannot obtain the materials. So the
buyer cannot use the uncertainty surrounding availability to saddle the
seller with damages. On the other hand, the seller too is constrained by the
trade usage because if the seller obtains the materials, he must sell them to
the buyer. He cannot simply decide that he would like to sell some of the
500 tons to another buyer who will pay more money. Thus, the trade usage
constrains opportunism by both parties and the court can admit the trade
usage without having to make difficult judgments about whether a party's
deviation from a stated quantity is a form of opportunistic behavior on the
particular facts of a case.
In other cases where the parties agreed on stipulated quantities ex ante
and one party seeks to deviate from the express terms, alleging as in
Columbia Nitrogen that the terms were not mandatory and were subject to
renegotiation by the parties, the trade usage is not on its face designed to
constrain opportunistic behavior. In such cases, one must ask why the
parties omitted trade usages that made quantity terms flexible. The
quantity variation may signal opportunistic behavior by one party trying to
take advantage of shifting market conditions. Consequently, this is the
kind of trade usage that parties may have omitted from the express
contract. This is because the operation of the quantity variation should
depend on how the parties have behaved, and they may be awaiting further
311
312

SeeS. Concrete Servs. v. Mableton Contractors, 407 F. Supp. 581,584-85 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
Michael Schiavone & Sons v. Securalloy Co., 312 F. Supp. 801, 804 (D. Conn. 1970).
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information to see if the other party's conduct justifies a departure from the
stipulated amounts. That may depend on whether the party seeking a
concession has himself acted opportunistically in the past. Because courts
may not have that information readily available, or may be unable to judge
such information, courts will be more hesitant to excuse such deviations.
However, where the evidence suggests that the party seeking a concession
on quantity has himself acted opportunistically in the past, a court may be
more willing to admit such evidence. One example is the Columbia
Courts have also demonstrated a reluctance to
Nitrogen case. 313
incorporate trade usages when there is the potential for one-sided
opportunistic behavior by the party seeking to incorporate the trade usage,
especially in situations where the court may have difficulty verifying the
good faith of the party seeking to invoke the practice.
A seminal case illustrating this principle is Albus v. Toomey. 314 In
Albus, the plaintiff purchased cloth from the defendant and attempted to
return the goods two months later. 315 The plaintiff tried to show that it was
customary for buyers to purchase cloth in advance, warehouse the
merchandise, and examine the goods only when the buyer was ready to use
them. 316
In this case there is great potential for the buyer to engage in one-sided
opportunistic behavior if the trade usage is admitted, as the buyer could
purchase cloth speculatively and invoke the trade usage if the price fell, or
an anticipated order for clothing never materialized. This would allow the
buyer to shift all of the risks of a speculative transaction to the seller. The
courts are also in a poor position to recognize opportunism when it does
occur in situations like Albus. The cloth was sold two months before the
buyer attempted to return it. If the cloth was defective, the court will have
a difficult time discerning whether it was sold in a defective state, or if the
buyer (either through neglect or deliberate actions) ruined it.
In situations such as the one presented in Albus, courts are rightfully
hesitant to incorporate a trade usage. Where there is clear potential for
one-sided opportunistic behavior, and the courts are in a poor position to
determine whether a party has acted opportunistically, courts will not
incorporate a trade usage. Instead the parties themselves are in the best
position to detemline whether or not opportunistic behavior is occurring.
The one-sided nature of the potential opportunism is the reason that
m The court cited a pattern of conduct by the parties in previous contracts where the quantity
term was readjusted, including at least four instanc.es where the roles were reversed and the defendant,
acting as the seller, allowed the plaintiff to avoid taking delivery of any of the contracted goods.
Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 8 (4th Cir. I971).
314
Albus v. Toomey, II 6 A. 9 I 7 (Pa. I 922).
315
ld. at9I7.
316
I d. at 9I 8.
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vulnerable parties must have recourse to "their stricter contractual rights
whenever they consider their contracting partner to be acting
opportunistically. " 317 To take away the seller's discretion in this case
would leave him defenseless in the event that the purchaser acted
opportunistically, and would reduce the seller's willingness to contract.
Thus, the trade usage at issue in Albus is similar to the custom allowing for
the return of lame horses cited by Professors Kraus and Walt. 318
VII. HOW THE REFRAMED DEBATE SOFTENS SOME OF THE CRITICISMS
AGAINST THE INCORPORATION STRATEGY

Understanding the taxonomy of bargaining impediments, as well as the
functional purpose of trade usages, provides a useful background for
understanding how trade usages may be beneficial in solving problems
(including the control of opportunism) that cannot otherwise be solved by
contract. Yet, in recent years, the neoformalists have launched a sustained
attack against the norm incorporation strategy underlying Article 2 of the
U.C.C. 319 These critics have failed to situate the debate within the context
of the taxonomy of bargaining constraints. They have failed to view trade
customs as a private response designed to maximize gains from trade by
controlling the effects of opportunism that might require legal enforcement
if other means of enforcement (private compulsion, sanctioning based on
reputation, or an organizational response) are unavailable. Moreover,
because the criticisms have tended to treat the incorporation strategy as an
aU-or-nothing proposition, they have failed to assess the particular reasons
for the omission of a substantive norm, or to assess whether the conduct
governed by the norm would be transparent to outsiders or whether courts
would have difficulty assessing the conduct. These factors, along with the
structural factors discussed earlier, might affect the efficacy of private,
versus public enforcement of a business norm. These failures have led
critics assessing the normative value of the strateg-y of incorporation to
undervalue the benefits of norm incorporation and to overestimate the
possibility of private enforcement. Their criticisms are not as compelling
after accounting for the role that private norms play in the context of
controlling for opportunistic behavior in incomplete contracts.
A. The Criticisms
320

The criticisms of incorporation fall into several distinct categories.
Some critics argue that a norm incorporation strategy is too costly because
317

Kraus & Walt, supra note 8, at 208.
See id. at 207-08.
319
See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L.J. 541, 585 (2003); Scott, supra note 13, at 870-71.
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it requires courts to make difficult determinations about the relevant norm,
and results in interpretive errors by courts, 321 as well as departures from the
Professor Bernstein's critique of
parties' intended meaning. 322
incorporation strategy posits that courts often mistakenly incorporate
norms that were never intended to govern relationships if they dissolved
into litigation. 323 The trade group critique of incorporation strategy
suggests that the rejection by many trade groups of contextualized norm
based strategy in favor of formalistic rules demonstrates the superiority of
formal rules. 324 Other critics argue that courts should not automatically
incorporate norms, because the process of norm development is flawed and
often results in inefficient norms. 325 The empirical critique of norm
incorporation argues that because norms simply do not exist, a strategy
premised on norm incorporation is impracticable and misguided. 326 The
two domains critique argues that legal enforcement of informal norms is
harmful, because it causes parties who never intended the informal norms
to be legally enforceable to be bound by them. This last argument is based
on the idea that informal norms and legal agreements should remain in
separate spheres, and that if courts enforce informal norms, then parties
will avoid using them for fear that they will be given legal effect
(sometimes referred to as the "rigidity effect"). 327 The moral hazard
critique posits that the incorporation approach will increase strategic
efforts by parties to claim a private trade meaning whenever it results in a
more favorable outcome than the ordinary meaning. 328 This final Part
argues that these critiques should be reassessed in light of the functional
approach suggested by this Article.
1. Interpretive Error
The current debate regarding the wisdom of the incorporation strategy
is premised on its comparison with the alternative, interpretive technique
of plain meaning. 329 Its proponents look at each strategy as a mechanism
321
Courts make many kinds of errors, including failing to understand the correct norn1 and
applying it incorrectly. They may also fail to give effect to the parties' express terms, finding that the
implied norms "trump" the parties' express terms. This may hinder contractual innovation. Scott,
supra note 13, at 857.
322
See Goetz & Scott, supra note 29, at 298.
323
See infi·a text accompanying note 3 71.
324
Bernstein, supra note 7, at 1771 (indicating a tendency ofNGFA arbitrators to "give far less
weight to these indicia of immanent business norms than do generalist courts[,]" and arguing that
empirical data suggests that parties would prefer to opt out of a legal system that gives legal recognition
to commercial norms).
325
See Posner, supra note 13, at 1724.
326
I do not address the empirical arguments made against the norm incorporation strategy.
Professor Lisa Bernstein dealt exhaustively with several instances that negated the existence of
universal trade norms in the cotton and grain and feed industries. See Bernstein, supra note 7, at 176687.
327
See Ben-Shahar, supra note 6, at 784 (discussing rigidity effect).
328
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 319, at 587.
329
"Plain meaning is literal sentence meaning." Kraus & Walt, supra note 8, at 194.
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that will allow the parties to "secure their desired interpretation at the
lowest cost. " 330
The two different strategies are associated with competing and
irreconcilable goals. The plain meaning strategy enables courts to
correctly interpret express terms, while incorporation strategy allows the
court to incorporate "privately developed prototypes into the stock of
useful default rules .... "331 Professors Schwartz and Scott see these goals
as conflicting. If courts give effect to the plain meaning, they may negate
the default rules incorporating trade usages. 332 If courts give effect to the
default rule, and incorporate stock prototypes, they may end up ignoring
the parties' express terms, allowing trade usages to trump conflicting,
express terms. 333
The normative debate addresses the various costs associated with each
strategy as a means of determining which one will generate the lowest
costs. The plain meaning strategy is thought to generate low interpretive
error costs by courts because of the "fairly clear set of non-domainspecific, common meanings associated with most terms . . . ." 334 Critics
tout the plain meaning approach as a strategy that can more easily achieve
"reliable interpretation" of the parties' express terms. 335 By contrast, the
incorporation strategy necessarily generates errors since courts must not
only identify the domain in which a commercial practice arises, but must
also offer a correct interpretation. 336 Because of the possibility that there
will be two opportunities for errors, 337 "incorporation regimes would be
expected to have a higher rate of interpretive error than plain meaning
regimes. " 338
On the other hand, a prime advantage of the incorporation strategy is
that it saves parties transaction costs. Parties do not have to translate all
specialized usages into plain meaning in an express contract. They can
count on the domain-specific meanings without having to expressly
incorporate them or translate them into terms with a plain meaning.
The current debate on interpretive error portrays the strategies for
contract interpretation in a way that is divorced from the parties' own goals
in negotiating contracts to solve problems and maximize gains from trade
by controlling discretion and behavior. Those goals should remain central
to any approach to contract interpretation. Excluding those goals from a
cost/benefit analysis causes current scholars to ignore two matters that
330

!d. at 196.
Scott, supra note 13, at 856.
m Schwartz & Scott, supra note 319, at 585-86.
333
!d. at 586.
334
Kraus & Walt, supra note 8, at 198.
m See, e.g., Scott, supra note 13, at 857.
336
Kraus & Walt, supra note 8, at 198.
m See id.
m Kraus & Walt, supra note 8, at 198.
331

JUDICIAL INCORPORATION OF TRADE USAGES

2006]

515

might affect the analysis of whether a plain meaning or incorporationist
strategy would be preferable. First, the plain meaning approach assumes
that "most terms have a relatively clear, objective 'plain' meaning, which
consists of their most common interpretation. "339 Yet, the prior taxonomy
suggests that a menu of tetms available under plain meaning will not be of
any use to parties trying to control behavioral opportunism in the face of
uncertainty. 340 When the failure of the parties to incorporate trade usages
into their contracts is due to barriers to effective bargaining, we may not be
able to look to the plain meaning of the contract to interpret it, and we have
to inquire whether the trade usage was established or developed to increase
gains from trade. Where barriers exist, a menu of terms with plain
meanings simply will not help the parties achieve their goals and may
undercut any possible advantage of such a regime in avoiding error costs.
The current plain meaning approach thus ignores considerable
obstacles that parties face in negotiating express contracts to control
behavior. Insisting that parties solve their problems through express
contractual language adds to the drafting burdens of the parties, and
ignores another large cost: that parties who are unable to draft express
contract clauses to mitigate contractual hazards will have far fewer gains
from trade to share. 341
Two champions of this plain meaning approach, Professors Scott and
Schwartz, discount the drafting cost that would burden parties who would
have to specifically opt in and affirmatively signal to the court that they
want their contracts to be interpreted in specialized trade meanings called
"party talk," not "majority talk." 342 They argue that the costs would be low
for two reasons. First, the parties would not have to undertake a detailed
description of all of the customs but could rely on a generalized clause
such as a clause that "[t]his agreement is to be read in light of the customs
of the widget trade." 343 Second, because many of the provisions of any
contract have a majority talk meaning and only a small portion of the terms
have a specialized party talk meaning, having a default rule based on
private trade meanings would be costly, as it would require parties to
specifically opt out and specify all of the instances where a majority plain
meaning is intended. 344
Requiring the parties to generally opt into all trade customs or trade
language would provide some evidence to a court of the parties' decision
that customs would form part of their contract. Such a requirement would
be beneficial because it would deprive one party of the ability to argue,
339
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perhaps strategically, that the contract should be governed by "majority"
talk rather than customary trade practices. 345
However, an approach requiring a generalized opting into commercial
practices has limitations.
First, since many practices may arise
spontaneously, through evolution, blanket consent to these practices
beforehand may not be meaningful.
Second, where the usage is extremely common, widespread, and well
la1own, the parties may not even think about actually explicitly including
an opt-in term. Third, there may be difficulties in getting parties to engage
in a wholesale adoption of all customs and usages because there are
different types of usages, some relating to terms of art, some to controlling
behavior (such as opportunism) and some amounting to waivers of express
terms through conduct. The possibility that a party may invoke a trade
usage opportunistically could deter parties from opting to incorporate all
trade usages. Fourth, these opt-in clauses would not be particularly
helpful, because when one party is trying to determine whether the other
party will act opportunistically, general assurances might not be believed
by a party who is uncertain about the other party's proclivities for
opportunism. 346
The absence of a ritualistic pledge to follow custom should not
necessarily be determinative of whether the court should resort to business
nonns to interpret a contract. This is especially true when the norm was
designed to benefit both parties by curbing opportunistic behavior, there
are large sunk costs on the part of one party, and there is no reason to
believe that the parties omitted the trade usage to allow further information
to develop about conditions that could best be judged by the parties as
opposed to a court.
Thus, if I contract for the delivery of mille in 1930 and fail to mention
that I want my mille delivered cold and in the morning/ 47 and there is a
business custom that milk is delivered cold and in the morning, the court
should incorporate that custom even if the parties fail to regularly promise
to abide by the custom.
The situation is emblematic of an agency problem where one party has
discretion over some aspect of performance during the course of a contract.
The custom serves to constrain this discretion in a way that benefits both
parties, and it may have been difficult for the parties to see a need for
explicitly negotiating a term on the time of delivery and the temperature,
because these terms are obvious to anyone in the trade. The failure to
enforce the contract, as supplemented by trade custom, even if the parties
345
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failed to abide by a ritualistic pledge, would allow one party to escape
responsibility for a risk that both parties would have assumed fell on the
milk seller. This would be detrimental to future contracting parties as well.
Failure to enforce the trade usage would signal to potential contracting
parties that when one party retains discretion to act, they would not be
prevented from doing so opportunistically. This would cause parties to
discount what they are willing to pay on contracts where the other party
retains some discretion to act.
The problem with insisting on a ritualistic pledge to trade custom is
that the parties may not understand why such a pledge would be needed,
because the trade usage is so obvious to the parties that they may consider
it to be the "plain meaning" of the contract. This can be seen in the Hurst
v. W J. Lake & Co. case. 348 The seller in Hurst contracted to deliver horse
scraps to the buyer. Ifthe protein content of the meat was below 50%, the
buyer would receive a discount on the price. 349 A portion of the delivered
horsemeat had a protein content of 49.53% and another portion had a
protein content of 49.96%. 350 Accordingly, the buyer paid the discounted
price on those pmiions. The seller sued for the difference between the
original and discounted price, relying on a trade usage that "50% protein"
was understood to mean anything above "49.5% protein."351 The court
admitted the trade usage and ruled in favor of the seller on the defendant's
motion for judgment on the pleadings. 352
It seemed clear-given the court's findings of fact-that the defendant
buyer was acting opportunistically. Having contracted and understood the
meaning that 50% meant anything 49.5% or above, the defendant then
tried to receive an opportunity (a lower price) that it had bargained away
when it made the contract. 353 By admitting the trade usage, the court was
able to translate the language of the parties into common English in which
50% meant 49.5% or above, thereby preventing one party from acting
opportunistically.
Rather than requiring parties to ritualistically pledge adherence to trade
custom, the court should ascertain why parties develop these customs, then
determine whether courts should intervene to enforce them, or whether
parties should police defections through private sanctions.
Giving a party the ability to decide whether to pursue a cause of action
in court or to pursue reptuational sanctioning as the ideal means of
enforcement, even if they had not ritualistically agreed that custom would
govern, would provide value and enhance choices for the parties.
348
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Plain meaning advocates, in addition to mistakenly assuming that a
plain meaning approach can solve behavioral opportunism problems, may
have also exaggerated the interpretive error costs associated with
incorporation strategies that require courts to assess various domains and
commercial contexts for the existence of norms. 354 If courts considered the
structural barriers (uncertainty, opportunism and sunk costs) that prevent
the parties from bargaining to control the myriad forms of opportunism, the
futility of generalized clauses to cooperate, and the ability of private parties
to self-enforce, there would be fewer judicial errors when applying
customs. Once courts considered this structure and analyzed private
commercia,! norms accordingly, courts could more readily discern whether
a norm would advance the parties' goals. Courts could more quickly grasp
the function of the norm and perhaps facilitate a better recognition of the
contours or parameters of the norm, and thus avoid the interpretative
difficulties that some cases might otherwise present.
The current cost/benefit analysis of the two strategies may also be
inaccurate not only because the error costs are misestimated, but also
because the advantages of the incorporation strategy are underestimated.
Not only does the incorporation strategy save parties the specification costs
of translation, but it also permits parties to maximize the gains from trade
by allowing the parties to mitigate contractual hazards. 355 In assessing the
merits of an incorporation strategy, the comparison must include not only
an evaluation of the plain meaning strategy, with its ability to offer
predictable meanings to parties using terms, but also its ability to solve
problems "that even in principle it cannot be used properly to resolve." 356
Since the success of a plain meaning strategy depends on selecting a term
with a plain meaning, it will not help when the problems of uncertainty,
opportunism and sunk costs converge to hinder a complete bargain with
express terms to which a plain meaning strategy can be applied. The
question then becomes: "What should the court do when clear bargaining
impediments exist, and the parties have devised strategies outside the
contract for solving problems and maximizing gains?" Plain meaning
limited to enforcing the express terms of the contract will simply not be
able to resolve that question, nor will a ritualistic invocation of trade
practices.
354
The presence of the customs themselves might serve as benchmarks to more closely define the
outlawed opportunistic behavior, and thus mitigate another criticism-namely, the fact that "standard
rules ... designed for general application ... are often incongruent with the shifting needs of various
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355
WILLIAMSON, supra note 55, at 60.
356
Kraus & Walt, supra note 8, at 195.

JUDICIAL INCORPORATION OF TRADE USAGES

2006]

519

2. Norm Incorporation Does Not Lessen Burden on Courts and
Therefore It is Too Costly
One criticism that has been leveled against the norm incorporation
strategy is that it will be too difficult for courts to identify norms and to
apply them in specific cases. In fact, Professor Craswell argues that norm
incorporation will force courts to shoulder the same burdens that they face
in common law adjudication. Craswell's argument is that the statutory
decision to resort to custom does not free the court from any burden, and
thus, if we are going to continue to resort to incorporation as a strategy, it
cannot be because doing so "can serve as a guide to something that courts
would face great difficulty identifying on their own."357 Additionally,
courts will inevitably face stringent burdens in deciding if a norm exists
and whether to apply it in a particular case.
Richard Craswell argues that the process of identifying and applying
norms is akin to the process of common law adjudication. In both
instances, courts must grapple with "issues of distinction and analogy." 358
With regard to common law cases, courts must decide whether the fact
pattern at issue is similar enough to be covered by prior precedent, or
whether there are relevant and important distinctions that call for a
different result. Craswell finds that the process of jurisprudence or
common law adjudication is such that the ''judge's normative views will
influence the rule he or she ultimately selects."359
Ascertaining norms involves many of the same questions of judgment
that common law adjudication involves. Rather than simply finding a
custom, a court must decide "how broadly or narrowly the custom ought to
be framed. " 360 That process of defining the custom then determines
whether a particular case is covered by the custom. Cra:swell, therefore,
finds the process of norm identification not an easy one. A court does not,
and cannot, simply "find" the norms because the patterns on which they
rest are ambiguous.
However, while the criticism suggests that there will be judicial
burdens associated with applications of norms, this is not a compelling
reason to reject norm incorporation as a strategy. First, the fact that there
is some burden on courts seems to be a dispositive reason to reject norms
only if one presupposes a false and unrealistic view that norm
incorporation will be easy. In fact, in ordt;:r to determine what norms
should be incorporated into parties' contracts, courts may have to develop
a model for understanding why parties develop norms and how those
norms may facilitate the achievement of the parties' goals that may not be
357
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possible through express contract. Although that initial process may
require some effort on the part of courts, once that understanding is
developed and honed, it will be possible for courts to more easily identify
and apply some norms-those specifically designed to control
opportunistic behavior. That understanding may help mitigate some
concerns that have been raised about the burdens imposed by courts by the
incorporation strategy.
The taxonomy presented in this Article will help courts to see the ways
that business norms can serve to reduce costs for parties by mitigating
hazards of opportunism. Thus, if the norm involved serves to mitigate
hazards and increase gains from trade, there would be every reason for the
court to enforce the norm. It may be easier for a court to decide if a norm
exists, and if so, how it should be applied if the court can conceptualize the
way in which particular norms serve certain goals of constraining
If a court simply
opportunism under conditions of uncertainty.
incorporates norms that exist, without an understanding of why contracting
parties did not expressly incorporate the norms and why incorporation
might promote welfare maximization, then a court is likely to commit
errors. A similar result might happen if a court tried to apply a statute
without an understanding of the legislative purpose in crafting the statute.
In addition, the fact that there is a burden on the court presented by
norm incorporation strategy may still be worth the cost, especially if
judicial incorporation of norms can help to achieve the parties' strategies
of mitigating the hazards of opportunism and thereby increasing gains from
trade at a lower cost than infonnal, non-legal enforcement of such
commercial practices.
3.

Increase in Moral Hazard

Plain meaning advocates assert that allowing private, non-maJonty
meanings for contract interpretation will foster moral hazard and is
therefore undesirable. 361
Professors Scott and Schwartz argue that incorporating trade meanings
will foster moral hazard more than the alternative plain meaning
strategy. 362 They posit that it will be harder for a party to use plain
meaning for strategic purposes and thus it should be the preferred rule. If
363
parties A and B were to write a contract in specialized "party talk, " and
it turned out that the contract was a bad deal for B, B might try to argue
that the court should use majority talk to interpret the contract if that
majority talk favored B more than the private trade language. Although
such strategic behavior would be possible, it would be relatively rare since
it would occur only when "words in a particular private language ... have
361
36'
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a clear but different meaning in the majority language that also favored ...
B. ,364
On the other hand, Scott and Schwartz argue that if the parties could
always argue private meanings-as they could under an incorporation
regime-there would be such a multiplicity of private meanings to resort to
that it would foster more instances of the strategic use of private meanings.
If courts required that parties signal to each other and the court that the
contract was written, and should be interpreted in a private language, the
possibility that a party would "attempt to rescue itself from a bad deal by
claiming that its contract was written in a mythical private language"
365
would be reduced.
This Article posits that contextualist interpretation rather than
insistence on plain meaning will often reduce moral hazard rather than
increasing it, especially in cases where the contextual incorporation is of a
usage specifically designed to curb opportunistic behavior that might occur
during the course of lingering performance obligations throughout the
course of a contract.
Scott and Schwartz utilize Southern Concrete Services v. Mableton
Contractors, to demonstrate that parties can invoke "a fictional favorable
private meaning to a majority talk contract."366 The buyer claimed that a
contractual provision obligating the buyer to purchase "approximately
70,000 cubic yards" could be met when the buyer only needed and
accepted 12,542 yards to complete the project. 367
In Southern Concrete, the court rejected evidence that the specific
quantities should be interpreted as estimates, and thereby insisted that the
contract quantities should be interpreted in accordance with majority/plain
meaning talk that would normally be ascribed to the words "70,000." The
court rationalized the result by recognizing the need to prevent "a frontal
assault on the essential terms of a clear and explicit contract." 368
Despite the court's championing of plain meaning, it may have been
the case that insisting on plain meaning was the preferred strategy to
prevent opportunistic behavior by the buyer. It is not clear that plain
meaning should always be the linguistic default that parties must opt out
of. In some cases adherence to plain meaning or a dictionary definition,
and a refusal to admit evidence of a trade usage, may actually foster
opportunism, and parties would presumably no longer "prefer courts to
assume that they wrote in majority talk." 369 In cases, such as Dixon,370 a
364

!d. at 586.
!d.
!d. at 586 n.85 and accompanying text (discussing S. Concrete Servs. v. Mableton Contractors,
407 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1975)).
367
S. Concrete Servs., 407 F. Supp. at 582.
368
!d. at 584.
369
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 319, at 587.
370
Dixon v. Irmaos & CIA, Ltd. v. Chase Nat'! Bank ofN.Y., 144 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1944).
365
366

522

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:451

court admitting and enforcing the trade usage serves to increase value by
allowing the parties to provide a means of enforcing a private strategy
(trade usage) specifically designed to curb opportunism. In Dixon, had the
court refused to admit the trade usage and insisted on plain meaning, it
would be allowing the bank to opportunistically evade a risk that it had
assumed in issuing the letter of credit. Thus, there is no single unitary
strategy to be followed in order to curb opportunism and plain meaning
interpretations can often serve to increase opportunism rather than curb it.
4.

The Two Domains Argument: Keeping Iriformal Norms Separate
and Uneriforceable

The two domains argument separates legally enforceable formal norms
and legally unenforceable informal norms. The argument posits that while
parties may adhere to informal norms, they do not intend for those
informal norms to be legally enforced by courts in a dispute. 371 The notion
is that there are separate domains for informal norms and formal
obligations and that each domain has its own means for sanctioning nonconforming or deviant behavior. Informal norms should be enforced by
non-legal sanctions and formal legal obligations should be enforced by
legal sanctions.
Arguments against "judicializing" parties' informal norms take several
forms. Because each of these arguments against norm incorporation rests
on distinct assumptions, it is critical to examine those assumptions to see if
they are logical and if there are other assumptions that would be more
consistent with current theories of how parties develop norms, how and
why those norms are incorporated into law,372 and what purposes such
incorporation serves.
The model supposes that the parties have a variety of informal and
formal norms at their disposal. In their contract, parties will deliberately
choose "from a rich set of formal and informal norms an optimal
combination of norms to regulate their conduct. " 373 Incorporating informal
norms and giving them legal effect upsets this deliberately constructed
template.
Erroneous legal incorporation of informal norms would
undermine the informal norms and violate the parties' intention to give
legal effect only to the formal norms.
However, the two domains criticism tends to ignore the bargaining
context of commercial norms. If there were no bargaining impediments,
then the failure to formally include the norms in a contract might tend to
support the inference that the parties deliberately intended the informal
norms to remain without legal effect. Presumably, absent such obstacles,
371
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the parties could simply expressly incorporate any relevant trade usages.
But given the obstacles to drafting contracts that expressly solve all of the
parties' problems, and the disinclination of parties to believe ritualistic
promises to refrain from opportunistic behavior, it is possible to conclude
that the failure to expressly incorporate norms in contracts is not a result of
deliberate omission and a desire to keep the norm legally unenforceable,
but rather was of transaction costs. Even simple statements by the parties
that they would incorporate all trade usages, course of dealing and course
of performance would add transaction costs and in some instances parties
might be reluctant to bind themselves to all commercial practices since
they might open themselves up to the possibility of strategic invocation of
the usage by the other party. The two domains argument is also less
persuasive when one focuses on an actual example. That example will
show that courts are unlikely to mistakenly incorporate the informal norm
if it is examined in the context of the parties' goals and bargaining
impediments. The example of a formal norm given by Kraus and Walt is
the presence of a warranty disclaimer in 90% of horse sale contracts.374
The example of an informal commercial norm given by Kraus and Walt is
the right of return in horse sale contracts when the horse is found to be
lame. 375 This norm was intended to remain an informal accommodation
rather than a legally operative norm. Because horse sellers want to retain
the right to insist on a strict contract right denying the right of return in
cases where the buyer is "behaving opportunistically,"376 courts should
decline to legally incorporate the right of return for lame horses into a
contract if the seller chose to insist on his contractual rights.
This example, however, does argue against the strategy of legal
incorporation of informal norms. If one examines the context of the horse
sale, including the impediments faced by the parties and the problems of
behavioral 1.mcertainty discussed earlier, one might decide that since
guarding against and mitigating the effects of opportunistic behavior is a
key goal of contracting parties, the informal norm was not a right of return
of lame horses already accepted by buyers, but rather a right of return as
long as the buyer is not acting opportunistically.
If the seller accepted the return of all horses when a buyer complained
that the horse was lame, the seller could have some uncertainty about
whether a particular buyer was responsible for the condition of the horse,
and thus the seller would be reluctant to take the horse back. The informal
norm that the seller would ordinarily take the horse back if it were lame but
not mandating such a return privilege would help to guard against
opportunistic behavior by the buyer.
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Thus, looking at the context, it is possible to see that the parties might
have difficulty putting an express term in the contract to mandate the return
of lame horses if there were the possibility that the buyer could exercise
the right in an opportunistic fashion. The seller would be reluctant to
accept a mandated return in all cases if the buyer could behave
opportunistically and there were asymmetries about that fact.
5. Mistakenly Incorporating Informal Relationship Preserving Norms
When at an End Game Situation377

Another prime argument against norm incorporation is that courts
incorporating commercial norms often look to and enforce relationshippreserving norms (RPNs) as the source for establishing the substantive
norm. They often mistakenly do so at the end of a contractual relationship
when RPNs should no longer govern and only end game nonns (EGNs)
should be applied. 378 Thus, the norm incorporation strategy is inherently
flawed because when assessing trade usages for incorporation, courts will
often legally recognize norms that were only meant to govern when the
parties themselves were acting to "cooperatively resolve disputes among
themselves" and still "want[ed] to preserve their relationship. "379
This Article argues that two significant counterarguments may render
this criticism of norm incorporation less compelling. The first is premised
on the view that the content of all trade usages and other norms can be
explained in terms of a bifurcated character. There are certain norms and
practices to which parties informally adhere, but the assumption is that
they intend to do so only so long as they "trust one another and/or value
potential future dealings." 380 When the parties face an irrevocable endgame situation, they no longer want those norms to govern. It is not clear
that all trade usages have this binary character, which Professor Bernstein
ascribes to them.
Secondly, in deciding what the law should do about incorporating
norms, courts should make decisions that will maximize joint gains from
trade, considering the ex post and ex ante consequences. Where parties
have devised certain norms or developed private strategies for solving
problems that are difficult to control ex ante, it is important to incorporate
those norms and not to carve out an exception or to routinely give parties
an escape from the operation of the norm if the relationship ends. Doing
so would be inefficient because it would deprive parties of the ability to
overcome the structural barriers to negotiating a first best outcome.
377
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378
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This efficiency loss allegedly occurs because when parties intend to
relegate certain obligations to a non-legal realm, and courts mistakenly
incorporate the wrong types of norms-RPNs rather than EGNsimposing additional costs on the parties. This error may occur where the
381
It may also
unwritten practices depend on unverifiable information.
interfere with the parties' autonomy and choice by "prevent[ing] them
from selecting their preferred mix of legal and extralegal
provisions .... "382 In addition, since the incorporation of a RPN is more
complicated than an ENG-which is ordinarily associated with the strict
enforcement of the contract's terms, the incorporation of RPNs will be
more costly because of the likely interpretive errors.
The argument that courts should not incorporate norms "that the
pmiies had developed to apply to their relationship when it was expected to
last,"383 after the relationship has broken down and that there is no reason
to continue the customs when the trust has dissipated, has several flaws. It
is premised on the idea that a trade usage exists only as a kind of an
informal accommodation strategy to ongoing contractual disputes. An
example might be a price adjustment that a merchant makes when the
goods fall below the standard in the contract. Such a routine price
adjustment is part of "the give and take of ordinary mercantile life,"384 but
at the same time, parties would not want that informal accommodation to
be legally required. The anti-incorporationists argue that recognizing the
general legitimacy of the incorporation strategy would require that the law
also give effect to a variety of business norms that are not meant to be
legally enforced, including the accommodation or grace strategy, in which
one party forgives the non-performance of the other party but does not
intend that forgiveness be required in future cases where there is a contract
violation.
Nan·owly conceptualizing the incorporation doctrine as one that
necessarily results in judicializing accommodations that were meant to
remain extra-legal fails as a basis for assessing the propriety of
incorporation strategy for several reasons. It is not clear that a court would
recognize a relationship-preserving nom1 and apply it as a trade practice to
an endgame dispute. The desire of the parties to keep the practice informal
and extra-legal would prevent courts from recognizing the practice as part
of the parties' agreement. 385
Thus, even if incorporation were recognized as theoretically sound,
courts would not necessarily incorporate such accommodation practices.
381
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Legal decision makers would first have to situate the practice (of
accommodation) into the larger context ofproblems that the parties are
trying to solve to determine whether incorporation would advance
efficiency by solving a problem for the parties at a cheaper cost than the
other private strategies that the parties might devise to achieve their goals,
given the obstacles that existed to express contracting on the matter.
Without that context and a comparison of different legal and extra-legal
strategies for solving the parties' problems, it is impossible to determine
whether a strategy of norm incorporation would actually result in the
incorporation of a particular set of practices. A court could conclude that
because an incorporation of a norm would foster opportunistic behavior or
lead to other losses, it should not be incorporated. Thus, it is hard to
conclude that norm incorporation necessarily will result in efficiency
losses. A party's decision to have certain extra-legal accommodation
strategies remain legally unenforceable does not mean that courts should
reject a norm incorporation strategy for all trade usages without an analysis
of whether incorporation of the particular practices would advance parties'
goals.
In the example given by Bernstein to illustrate the proposition that
"merchants do not necessarily want RPNs to be applied by courts in endgame situations,"386 the Code drafters faced the choice of either giving
legal recognition to a practice of price adjustment that was informally
subscribed to by the parties once a dispute arose or to insist on the
contractual terms of perfect tender. Llewellyn had considered substantial
performance as an alternative to the perfect tender rule to reflect the
realities of merchants not insisting on perfect tender; however, the Code
drafters settled on perfect tender as the Code rule.
The fact that the Code rejected the particular incorporation of price
adjustment as a merchant response to flawed performance does not mean
that the incorporation strategy itself is inherently flawed. Although the
Code drafters rejected the substantial performance rule as an alternative to
perfect tender, the decision to do so must be considered in the context of
the goals that the strategy was designed to solve against the possible costs
of an alternative strategy. In each case, of course, there is a risk that one
party may act opportunistically. Because a departure from perfect tender
would arguably promote opportunistic behavior by allowing sellers to
"unload all of their shopworn and defective goods," 387 and claim that they
had substantially performed and "would also give juries a vast amount of
discretion that would lead to erratic and error-prone decisions," 388 the costs
of incorporating such a strategy were perhaps thought not to be worth the
costs of incorporation-at least where other extra-legal reputational
386
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sanctions existed that could curb the potential for opportunism by buyers
who would otherwise use the perfect tender rule to escape their obligations
in a declining market. 389 Thus, rejections of the incorporation of particular
merchant practices that would foster opportunism could still be consistent
with a policy of incorporation at least where a cost/benefit analysis would
indicate that incorporation would be more efficient.
To the extent that Bernstein's criticism suggests that incorporating all
pmiies' commercial norms or practices would be misguided because they
are always intended to remain unenforceable, it should be rejected because
it ignores a fundamental principle of contract. In deciding whether a
particular rule would maximize the benefits of exchange for the parties, the
issue should be whether value would be maximized considering the ex post
and ex ante consequences of a legal incorporation decision. When parties
have a dispute, one pmiy may claim that incorporation of certain norms
would violate his or her present desires and intentions. However, in
crafting legal rules and deciding whether to incorporate norms, the
decision maker must take account of the ex ante legal effect of rules on
future parties. Using that calculation in order to maximize the joint gains
from trade, courts may decide to incorporate certain norms even when one
party may currently have an affinnative desire to break from that custom
by claiming that only ENGs should govern.
The fact that the parties' interests diverge at the point of dispute and at
least one party would prefer not to be governed by prior norms and seeks
to escape from such norms to promote his/her own self-interest, does not
necessarily mean that the court should refuse to apply relationshippreserving norms. In evaluating that question, the court should focus on
whether the incorporation of such a norm when viewed ex ante would be
one that the parties would want to govern their contract because it would
serve their purpose of maximizing overall gains from trade. If so, the court
should incorporate the nonn.
6. Alternatives to Informal Trade Customs: Trade Group Rules and
What They Say About Legal Intervention
The existence of informal trade norms raises the question of what role
the U.C.C. approach should take toward those norms. Since informal trade
practices could serve the goals of controlling deleterious conduct and
enhancing joint gain, legal intervention tb,rough norm incorporation would
seem justifiable as a means of enhancing the parties' welfare.
As an alternative to informal trade practices, the parties may subscribe
to a set of formal trade organization rules. A question arises: "Does the
existence of formal rules signal that the entire U.C.C. incorporation
strategy is misplaced?" The question evokes two separate criticisms of the
389
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norm incorporation strategy. First, since there is no evidence of national
uniform norms in certain industries, the strategy is misguided. Since such
norms do not exist, a strategy built on incorporating them must fail. The
second contention is that since some industries have opted out of the
U.C.C. rules and adopted alternative formal rules, the U.C.C. 's continued
effort to look to informal norms is a misplaced strategy. The implication is
that since the trade group rules address all-important matters, it
demonstrates that complete contracting is possible, making the default
rules of the U.C.C. with their resort to the parties' implicit customs
unnecessary.
Although there are a number of criticisms that can be made about the
trade group scholarship, this Article concentrates on whether the existence
of formal group rules in certain industries casts doubt on the entire U.C.C.
project of incorporating informal business practices.
If one accepts the model that parties will seek to solve key problems in
order to· maximize gains from trade, one way that members of a trade can
achieve that goal is by negotiating an individualized fully contingent
contract. However, parties can also achieve their welfare goals by
belonging to trade associations that will draft a variety of express standard
contract provisions covering all major contingencies. Epstein calls these
standard contract provisions "customary commercial terms. "390
Epstein thinks that these standard contract provisions-often
originating with trade groups-should be given great deference for a
variety of reasons. They are likely to be the product of reflection/ 91 and
are also likely to lessen the transaction costs of individually negotiating
contract provisions to solve future contingencies.
Group contract
provisions solve the problem of the public goods/collective action problem.
No one individual will want to undertake the enormous cost of the contract
on his own because the costs cannot be recouped in limited number of
transactions. However, the trade group can afford to shoulder the costs of
developing contracts suitable for those in the industry.
The existence of standard contract provisions developed by trade
groups does not by itself answer the question of how the law should treat
implicit customs that do not take the form of standard contract provisions
originating in trade groups.
If such standard contract provisions have not been made available
through subscription to a trade group membership, then the court should
decide whether to incorporate trade usages using a model. This Article
390

Epstein, supra note 29, at 823.
However, the origination of trade group norms in deliberate design does not necessarily mean
that the norms are superior to those that have evolved by spontaneous evolution. See Smith, supra note
90, at 470 (noting the "possible intelligence embodied in the rules, norms, and institutions of our
cultural and biological heritage that are created from human interactions but not by deliberate human
design").
391

2006]

JUDICIAL INCORPORATION OF TRADE USAGES

529

suggests that in deciding whether to incorporate such norms, the court
should consider (1) whether the problem is likely to be one that would be
susceptible to a bilateral contractual solution; (2) whether express trade
provisions have been adopted that deal comprehensively with all of the
problems likely to confront the parties; and (3) whether the informal
custom sought to be incorporated advances the parties' joint welfare goals.
Finally, one question that arises when considering what legal effect to
give different problem-solving mechanisms-both contractual and
informal-is whether the standard trade contract provisions are likely to
solve the key problem of opportunistic behavior. The problem of
controlling opportunistic behavior is complex and standard contract
solutions are unlikely to exist in trade rules. Moreover, the opportunism
problem would be difficult to control by a generalized clause promising to
be cooperative or to act in their joint interest because parties would not
believe such clauses and would discount them.
Thus, even in cases where highly developed trade organizations that
deal with a wide variety of problems are present, it is unlikely that
contractual solutions to the opportunism problem will be developed. Thus,
the problem of opportunism seems to be one that would be particularly
well suited to the development of informal norms that curb opportunistic
behavior. The parties could then enforce such norms through tit-for-tat
strategies, and retaliate against outliers or rely on the court to lend formal
sanctions to such norms when the parties calculate that the retaliation
strategies will be too costly or without effect.
VIII. CONCLUSION: HIERARCHY OF NORMS, ALL NORMS NOT EQUAL AND
THE LEGAL INTERVENTION QUESTION

Hopefully, this Article's examination of trade usages has alerted the
reader to the key role trade usages can play in solving endemic problems
such as opportunism that are not easily controlled by a complete contract.
Further the Article has alerted the reader to the helpful role courts can play
in intervening to enforce such practices where the costs of legal
enforcement may be less than alternative forms of self-sanctioning. An
understanding of that context may help to distinguish different factual
patterns in which trade usages arise that affect the analysis of whether the
law should intervene to enforce the norms.
Where trade usages arise as a private strategy to solve serious
problems endemic to contractual relationships and impediments exist to
explicit contractual solutions, there is every reason to think that by
enforcing the norms the court is maximizing gains from trade if it is less
costly than the private tit-for-tat strategies and self-sanctioning techniques
available to the parties, and ifthere are no negative externalities.

